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DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULTS
AND DEFAULTS⎯AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Dr. Helen Anderson*
Abstract: Australia’s new Rudd Government has indicated to business leaders that
it intends to review various aspects of corporate law, including the imposition of personal
liability on directors for corporate fault. Their concern is that the present corporate law
regime is causing directors to be overly cautious in making decisions, to the detriment of
the efficient operation of companies and the well-being of our economy. At the same
time, the government acknowledges the importance of imposing appropriate sanctions
where a company or its officers fail to meet required standards. These are universal
concerns. To inform this debate, this article will look at the way in which key aspects of
corporate law are dealt with internationally, and outline some reasons for convergence
and divergence.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Directors’ liability is a contentious area, and much has been written on
the subject of whether directors should be personally liable for corporate
faults and defaults.1 The new Australian government’s stated aim2 is to
* Associate Professor and Head of Department, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash
University, Australia. This article arose from the compilation of a book entitled DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR
CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008). I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the
authors to that book: Karen Wheelwright (Austl.); Prof. Janis Sarra (Can.); Chenxia Shi and Prof. Hu Bin
(P.R.C.); Prof. Cristina Mauro (Fr.); Prof. Paul von Nessen, Prof. Say H. Goo and Assoc. Prof. Low Chee
Keong (H.K.); Prof. Ok-Rial Song (S. Korea); Dr. Janine Pascoe (Malay.); Dr. Chris Noonan and Assoc.
Prof. Susan Watson (N.Z.); Assoc. Prof. Kathleen van der Linde (S. Afr.); Prof. John Lowry (U. K.); and
Prof. Erik Gerding (U.S.). While I would like to thank those authors for alerting me to the relevant laws of
their countries, any mistakes in this article are entirely my responsibility.
1
A small selection of these include: Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian
Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665 (2003); Rizwaan
Mokal, On Fairness and Efficiency, 66 MOD. L. REV. 452 (2003); David Wishart, Models and Theories of
Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 14 N. Z. UNIVERSITIES L. REV. 323 (1991); Ross Grantham, Directors’
Duties and Insolvent Companies, 54 MOD. L. REV. 576 (1991); Judith Freedman, Limited Liability: Large
Company Theory and Small Firms, 63 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2000); Jonathan Lipson, Directors’ Duties to
Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003);
Mark Van der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996);
Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980); Len Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities—
Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164 (1987); David Cohen,
Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures
Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited
Liability Company, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427 (1998).
2
See Dr. Ken Henry, Keynote Address to ASIC Summer School, Melbourne (Feb. 19, 2008),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1346/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=Ministers_Speech_to_ASIC_Sum
mer_School.htm. Dr. Henry is the Secretary to the Australian Treasury, and gave this speech on behalf of
The Hon. Nick Sherry, Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law.
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review the matter to determine whether liability is imposed appropriately
and effectively.
The aim of this article is to show ways in which other countries deal
with some of the corporate law problems which Australia faces. This article
does not seek to analyse these laws to conclude that they are superior or
inferior to the Australian ones. It has three objectives. First, it highlights the
diversity of directors’ liability law internationally, and makes and illustrates
two simple but often overlooked points—first, that there is more than one
way in which a regulatory objective can be achieved, and second, that some
economies appear to function perfectly well without any law at all on a
particular matter where such law seems essential elsewhere.
One might assume in this era of globalization that there would be
greater uniformity. Perhaps it is not surprising that emerging economies
such as China and South Korea do not have the same body of law as the
Commonwealth jurisdictions. But it is remarkable to find that Canada has
stringent laws imposing liability on directors for unpaid wages of employees
but not for trading insolvently, whereas the United Kingdom is the direct
opposite.3
The United States lacks both and Australia has both.4
Nonetheless, there are areas of the law where there is a considerable degree
of similarity.5
The article’s second objective is to show that where there is a
legislative will to impose stringent liability on directors, it can be done, and
has been done, in fairly harsh terms and in a variety of political and
economic climates. This serves to discount the suggestion that governments
should not legislate to impose onerous liability on directors, because it will
result in suitable businesspeople being reluctant to take directorships or will
make them overly risk-averse, to the detriment of economic growth, when
holding such positions.
This point goes to the issue of why liability is imposed at all. In
simplistic terms it is imposed to deter acknowledged forms of undesirable
conduct and to compensate parties adversely affected by the behavior in
question. Yet all parties adversely affected by undesirable conduct on the
part of directors are not given the same rights of redress, and more
remarkably for the purpose of this article, this unequal treatment is repeated
in many jurisdictions. The international overview conducted by this article
leads to the article’s third objective, which is to suggest that there is some
degree of correlation between the protection of powerful corporate
3
4
5

This liability is called wrongful trading in the United Kingdom. See infra Part III.A and III.B.
See infra Part III.A and III.B.
See infra Part II.
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stakeholders, the strictness of laws to protect these stakeholders, and the
similarity of those laws across the jurisdictions selected for examination.
Conversely, the protection of vulnerable stakeholder groups is done through
case law and legislation which is both diverse and generally lenient.
This article is divided into Parts. Part II gives some examples of
similarity of laws, although even in such cases, there is no generally
accepted template for their format or even adoption across all the
jurisdictions surveyed. While many areas of director liability could have
been looked at, three areas—capital raising, unremitted employee tax
deductions, and protection of the environment—have been chosen to
demonstrate the objectives outlined above. These neatly illustrate the way in
which powerful but different cohorts of corporate stakeholders—investors,
the government, and a vocal and well-supported lobby group—are protected
by the law.
Part III then looks at some instances of diversity of laws. These have
been chosen because they show the treatment of particularly vulnerable
stakeholder groups. The Part begins with insolvent trading, where there are
considerable differences among countries. Next, it looks at the protection of
employee entitlements, where many countries have not legislated at all.
Finally, it concludes with the tortious liability of directors qua directors,
where the law is unsettled and contentious even within jurisdictions.
A wide variety of countries is surveyed to get a broad overview of the
international picture. While they are countries from many parts of the
world, no claims are made that they are typical or representative of their
geographical region or their form of government. In addition, the article
does not profess to have captured all forms of legislation possible.
Inevitably, the question arises—why have some jurisdictions found it
necessary to impose liability in certain situations and in certain ways, where
other jurisdictions apparently function well with different laws or no law at
all? Part IV speculates as to what these reasons might be. While it is
beyond the scope of this article to try to answer this definitively, the article
reflects upon some possible reasons for similarity and diversity. Part V
concludes the article.
II.

SIMILARITY IN DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY LAWS BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS

This Part examines three areas of the law which show marked
similarities across the jurisdictions selected. As noted in the introduction, a
number of different areas could have been chosen to illustrate the point.
Capital raising, recovery of unremitted taxation installments, and protection
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of the environment were selected because they represent a range of powerful
stakeholder interests. What is noteworthy from an examination of the
legislation governing these areas across the jurisdictions surveyed is the
stringency of the laws and the degrees to which they adopt a common form
of words and structure.
A.

Similarities in Capital Raising Laws Across Selected Jurisdictions

Raising money is an essential operation for companies, and ensuring
investor confidence in the process has become a key aspect of most
jurisdictions’ corporate legislation.
The information on which the
fundraising bid is based comes from directors and other corporate officers
and experts. Substantial losses can be caused to investors and damage to
market confidence in general if funds are raised based on false or misleading
information, or incomplete information. It is this necessity for financing that
makes prospective investors powerful corporate stakeholders who can
demand considerable legislative protection.
As a result, most jurisdictions around the world, regardless of the
form of their economy or government, require companies to issue
prospectuses or other disclosure documentation to raise funds from the
public. Legislation imposes liability on parties, including directors, for
errors in, or omissions from, that documentation, subject to a similar range
of defences. Liability is relatively harsh. One of the reasons for the degree
of similarity could be that countries want access to the international market
for capital. Stringent and familiar-looking liability laws give confidence to
investors seeking to expand into an international location.
Australia6 has long had laws dealing with capital raising and imposing
liability on directors for misleading statements in relation to the offering of
securities.7 To prevent the inclusion of misleading information in the offer
and issue of securities by public companies, the Corporations Act 2001
contains extensive provisions for the public disclosure of information.8 The
offer must be made via a disclosure document9 in the form of a prospectus,
6
See Karen Wheelwright, Australia, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
7
See, e.g., Securities Industry Code, 1981, § 107 (Austl.) (effective July 1981).
8
Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 710-716 (Austl.).
9
Id. § 710 (“A prospectus for a body's securities must contain all the information that investors and
their professional advisers would reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the matters set out
in the table below.”). In relation to an offer to issue shares, the matters to be disclosed under that section
include “the rights and liabilities attaching to the securities offered; the assets and liabilities, financial
position and performance, profits and losses and prospects of the body that is to issue (or issued) the shares,
debentures or interests.”
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an offer information statement or a profile statement,10 and must not include
a misleading or deceptive statement11 or fail to include specified
information.12 Section 729 contains a table outlining the parties who may be
liable to those who suffered loss.13 This table includes directors, whether or
not they committed or were involved in the contravention, although defences
are available.14 In addition, the purchaser of the security may return it for a
refund, and if this is not forthcoming from the company, the directors are
personally liable for this amount.15 There are also criminal penalties
applicable.16
By contrast, in Canada,17 another federal jurisdiction, there is no
federal securities law statute.18 There are, however, provincial and territorial
securities laws in Canada which impose particular obligations on directors of
publicly traded corporations. In Ontario, for example, under the Ontario
Securities Act (1990), a purchaser of securities has the right to seek damages
from directors where the plaintiff can establish there was a
misrepresentation.19 This right exists, regardless of whether the purchaser
relied on the misrepresentation.20 Directors are jointly and severally liable.21
Defences available include due diligence,22 knowledge by the plaintiff of the
misrepresentation which did not therefore cause loss,23 reasonable grounds

10
Id. § 709(4). An offer information statement, instead of a prospectus, can be used for capital
raisings of $10 million or less. Profile statements are governed by § 709(2).
11
Id. § 728(1).
12
See id. §§ 710-15.
13
Id. § 729.
14
See, e.g., id. § 731 (due diligence, which is proved by forming a belief on reasonable grounds after
making reasonable enquiries); § 732 (lack of knowledge, which is available only in relation to offer
information statements and profile statements); § 733 (reasonable reliance upon information from someone
other than an employee or agent, where the director caused all due enquiries to me made; this defence is
available for all disclosure documents).
15
Id. § 737(3).
16
See id. § 1311, § 1483 (Schedule 3).
17
See Janis Sarra, Canada, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed.,
2008) (forthcoming 2008).
18
There are 13 jurisdictions in Canada, as well as a federal jurisdiction. See Canadian Legal
Information Institute, http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/.
19
Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5, § 130(1)(c) (1990) (Can.) (Ont.). Under § 1(1) of this Act,
“‘misrepresentation’ means (a) an untrue statement of material fact, or (b) an omission to state a material
fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the
circumstances in which it was made.”
20
See id. § 130(1).
21
Id. § 130(8).
22
See id. § 130(3), (5).
23
See id. § 130(2), (7).
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for believing an expert’s opinion,24 or lack of consent or withdrawal of
consent to the filing of the prospectus.25
In addition, four provinces in Canada26 have now enacted a statutory
civil liability regime for misrepresentation or failure to disclose to secondary
market participants. These provisions give secondary market investors a
right of action against issuers and key related persons in relation to public
misrepresentations or material omissions as required by securities law.
Secondary market participants claiming under these provisions need only to
show that they acquired or disposed of the company's securities during the
period between the time the misrepresentation or omission occurred and the
time that it was corrected.27
In New Zealand,28 capital raising is regulated by its Securities Act of
1978. A registered prospectus is required for securities offerings to the
public,29 failing which the offer is rendered void and the amounts subscribed
must be repaid.30 Joint and several liability may be imposed on directors
where these repayments are not made,31 although a defence is available to
the director upon proof of lack of personal default or negligence.32 Civil
liability, in the form of compensation orders33 or pecuniary penalties,34 is
provided for in relation to untrue statements in advertisements and registered
prospectuses. Subscribers may apply for compensation orders if they
subscribed “on the faith of an advertisement or registered prospectus that
includes an untrue statement, for the loss or damage that the persons have
sustained by reason of the untrue statement.”35 Defences are available under

24

Id. § 130(3)(c).
Id. § 130(3)(a), (b).
26
See Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5 (1990) (Can.) (Ont.); Securities Act, R.S.A., ch. S-4, Part 17.01
(2006) (Can.) (Alta.); Securities Act, R.S.M., ch. 18 (1987) (Can.) (Man.); Securities Act, c.S-42.2, Part
XVIII, (1988) (Can.) (Sask.).
27
Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5, § 138.5 (1990) (Can.) (Ont.); Securities Act, R.S.A., ch. S-4, Part
17.01, § 211.05 (2006) (Can.) (Alta.); Securities Act, R.S.M., ch. 18, § 188(1) (1987) (Can.) (Man.);
Securities Act, c.S-42.2, Part XVIII, § 136.21(1) (1988) (Can.) (Sask.). Other features of the new
legislation include a reverse burden of proof in relation to misrepresentations in “core” documents and
proportional liability in certain circumstances.
28
See Chris Noonan & Susan Watson, New Zealand, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE
FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
29
Securities Act 1978, 1978 S.N.Z. No. 103, § 37 (N.Z.) (as amended).
30
Id. § 37(5).
31
Id. § 37(6).
32
See, e.g., Alexander v. De Lacy, [1992] 6 N.Z.C.L.C. 68,020 (H.C.); Reuhman v. Paape, [2002] 9
N.Z.C.L.C. 262,988 (C.A.); Robinson v. Tait, [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R.30 (C.A.).
33
Securities Act 1978, 1978 S.N.Z. No. 103 § 55G (N.Z.) (as amended).
34
Id. § 55C.
35
Id. § 55G(1).
25

JANUARY 2009

DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY

7

§ 56.36 Directors may also be criminally liable pursuant to § 58(1) of the
Securities Act of 1978.37
China38 has had a long-standing problem with false statements,
misleading disclosure and market manipulation,39 and has recently made
significant improvements to the legislation dealing with these matters.
Companies listed on stock exchanges in China are prohibited from including
false or misleading information or omitting material information in
disclosure documents.40 Recent amendments have strengthened civil,
administrative, and criminal liabilities against persons who contravene
statutory provisions dealing with false statements.41
While the emphasis has been on punishment rather than compensation
of parties affected by the conduct,42 investors’ actions against directors who
have been administratively sanctioned or found liable in a criminal
proceeding are allowed by the Supreme People’s Court Rules.43 The liability
imposed on directors, which is joint with the company, is based on personal
fault.44 Examples of such fault include where they participate in making
false statements, or know or ought to know about the false statement but do
not act to prevent its publication.45
South Africa46 has both criminal and civil provisions dealing with
disclosure when shares are offered to the public.47 A director is liable to
compensate persons who relied on the prospectus and acquired shares.48
36
Id. § 56. These include the absence or withdrawal of consent to be a director or to the distribution
or registration of the advertisement or prospectus, or reasonable grounds to believe that statements made on
the authority of an expert or in a public officials document were true.
37
Id. § 58(1).
38
See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, China, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
39
See Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA ECON.
REV. 451, 459-64 (2003).
40
See Securities Law, ch. 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27,
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter P.R.C. Securities Law].
41
See id. art. 69; Company Law, art. 150, 153 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Oct. 27,2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.); Amendments to the Criminal Law, art. V
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 26, 2006, effective June 26, 2006)
(P.R.C.).
42
See P.R.C. Securities Law, art. 191, 193.
43
Supreme People’s Court Rules, arts. 26, 27, 28 (P.R.C.).
44
Supreme People’s Court Rules, arts. 21, 22, 23, 24 25 (P.R.C.).
45
Liability is also extended to situations where directors should assume responsibility for the false
statement and its effects. See Supreme People’s Court Rules, art. 28 (P.R.C.); P.R.C. Securities Law, art.
63; see also Z. Cui and M. Ma, Directors’ Liability to Shareholders in Cases Concerning False Statements,
2 CHINA LEGAL STUD. 96 (2003).
46
See Kathleen van der Linde, South Africa, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT
(Helen Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
47
See Companies Act 61 of 1973 ch. VI. (S. Afr.).
48
Id. § 160(2).
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Liability is strict,49 but a series of defences apply.50 Where the company
fails to refund moneys to investors who have not received the minimum
subscription51 or where a condition that shares would be listed has not been
fulfilled,52 directors are criminally and civilly liable. However, in these
cases, there is a defence to both civil and criminal liability where the director
can prove an absence of misconduct or negligence.53
Under Hong Kong’s54 Companies Ordinance55 “where a company
allots . . . any shares in or debentures of the company with a view to all or
any of those shares or debentures being offered for sale to the public, any
document by which the offer for sale to the public is made shall for all
purposes be deemed to be a prospectus.”56 Requirements are set out in
§ 38.57 According to § 41A (a), “a statement included in a prospectus shall
be deemed to be untrue if it is misleading in the form and context in which it
is included.”58 Under § 40, directors “shall be liable to pay compensation to
all persons who subscribe for any shares or debentures on the faith of the
prospectus for the loss or damage they may have sustained by reason of any
untrue statement included therein,” subject to defences set out § 40(2).59
Criminal penalties also apply, subject to defences.60 In addition, § 108 of the
Securities and Futures Ordinance provides for civil liability where “a person
makes any fraudulent misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation or
negligent misrepresentation by which another person is induced to invest in
securities or other forms of regulated investments.”61

49

See id. § 160(1)(a)-(b).
See id. § 160(3)(a)–(c), § 162(3)(a)–(c) (providing civil and criminal defences if the director
reasonably believed in the accuracy of the information in the prospectus); § 160(3)(c)(ii)–(iii),
§ 162(4)(b)–(c) (providing civil and criminal defences if the director did not consent to the issuance of the
prospectus and, upon learning that the prospectus was issued without their consent, gave reasonable public
notice of this fact, or that, after that consented to the issue of the prospectus, upon becoming aware that it
contained an untrue statement, they withdrew their consent and gave reasonable public notice of the
withdrawal and the reason therefore).
51
Id. § 165(5)-(6).
52
Id. § 169(4)(b) and (5)(a).
53
Id. § 165(5)(b) and § 169(5)(b).
54
See Say H. Goo et al., Hong Kong, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
55
Companies Ordinance, (1990) Cap. 32. (H.K.).
56
Id. § 41(1).
57
Id. § 38.
58
Id. § 41.
59
Id. § 40(1)(a), 40(2). Defences include withdrawal of consent, reasonable grounds for belief that
the statement was true, reliance on experts whose competence they had no grounds to doubt, and reliance
on public documents.
60
Id. § 40A, sched. 12.
61
Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571 § 108. (H.K.).
50
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The United States of America enacted the Securities Act of 1933 as a
result of the market crash of 1929.62 The legislation’s two main goals were
to ensure more transparency in financial statements so investors could make
informed decisions about investments, and to establish laws against
misrepresentation and fraudulent activities in the securities markets.63
Section 11(a)(2) of the Act provides for the liability of directors to acquirers
of securities for untrue statements or material omissions in registration
statements.
Defences
are
available
under
§ 11(b), including resignation from the role, lack of knowledge about the
registration statement, and reasonable belief in the opinion of experts.
In Malaysia,64 capital raising and disclosure of information is now
regulated by the Capital Markets and Services Act (2007).65 Prospectuses
must be registered66 and contain specified information.67 Pursuant to
§ 246, it is an offense for a person to “authorise or cause the issue of
prospectus”68 which contains any statement or information that is false or
misleading or which omits material information, violation of which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment. Civil compensation is available but
only where the investors’ loss has been caused by reliance on the
prospectus.69 Defences include due diligence,70 reasonable reliance on
another person such as a competent person,71 and lack of consent,72 although
the latter is arguably superfluous, as the words of § 246 itself connote an

62
See Erik Gerding, United States, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
63
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); see also Krista L. Turnquist, Pleading
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2395, 2404-05 (2000).
64
See Janine Pascoe, Malaysia, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson
ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
65
See Capital Markets and Services Act, (2007) (Malay.). The preamble to this Act states that it is
an “Act to consolidate the Securities Industry Act 1983 [Act 280] and Futures Industry Act 1993 [Act 499],
to regulate and to provide for matters relating to the activities, markets and intermediaries in the capital
markets, and for matters consequential and incidental thereto.”
66
See id. Part VI, §§ 232-33.
67
Id. § 236(1). This is defined to be “all such information that investors and their professional
advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to find in the prospectus,” which is further
defined in § 236(2) as information known to a wide list of persons connected to the company. Section
236(3) provides a list of factors relevant to the determination of the appropriate contents of the prospectus.
68
Id. § 246.
69
See id. § 248, Part XI, § 357.
70
Id. § 250.
71
Id. § 251.
72
Id. § 254.
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active participation by “authorising or causing the issue of the prospectus.”73
Some conduct also attracts criminal liability.74
In the United Kingdom,75 capital raising is governed by the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000. The duty of disclosure requires the
prospectus or listing particulars to:
contain all such information as investors and their professional
advisors would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to
find there, for the purposes of making an informed assessment
of—(a) the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and
losses, and the prospects of the issuer of the securities; and (b)
the rights attaching to the securities.76
The Act provides a compensation remedy to persons who have suffered loss
as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the relevant document or
any the omission from the particulars of any matter required to be
included.77 Defences are available under Schedule 10 of the Act.
In South Korea,78 there has been a process of legislative consolidation,
and the capital raising provisions are now located in the Capital Market and
Financial Investment Act, which was passed in August 2007. This Act
provides that where there are false or misleading statements or omissions
about material information in prospectuses used to offer securities to the
public, directors may be liable to purchasers for damages incurred as a
result.79 A due diligence defence applies. Directors may also be subject to
criminal liabilities for failure of the duty to disclose.80
In France,81 directors can be held liable under civil, criminal and
administrative provisions in relation to the issue of securities. The markets
are protected by an independent agency, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers

73

Id. § 246.
See id. § 243(12).
75
J. Lowry, United Kingdom, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson
ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008).
76
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, § 80 (U.K.).
77
Id. § 90.
78
O. Song, South Korea, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed.,
2008) (forthcoming 2008).
79
[Capital Market and Financial Investment Act] § 125 (S. KOR.).
80
Id. § 444.
81
C. Mauro, France, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008)
(forthcoming 2008).
74
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(“AMF”). While the Code de commerce deals with disclosures for listed
companies,82 the Code monetaire et financier provides for liability for:
[W]hoever carries out or attempts to carry out, directly or
through an intermediary, a manoeuvre intended to impede the
normal operation of a regulated market by misleading others
[or] . . . publicly disseminates, via whatever channel or means,
any false or deceptive information concerning the prospects or
the situation of an issuer whose securities are traded on a
regulated market, or the likely performance of a financial
instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market, which
might affect the price thereof.83
In summary, all the jurisdictions surveyed require some form of disclosure
document when companies seek to raise funds from the public. All impose
liability on directors for false statements and omissions in the
documentation, most being strict liability subject to defences and a few
requiring fault. The defences also showed marked similarities, including
due diligence, reasonable reliance on the advice of experts and lack of
consent to the statement. These liability provisions impose a considerable
burden on directors to ensure that correct and complete information is
provided to prospective investors.
B.

Similarities in Unremitted Employee Tax Installment Laws Across
Selected Jurisdictions

In many jurisdictions, companies act as tax collectors by retaining
from employees’ wages an amount representing the employees’ taxation
obligations with respect to those wages. This is then remitted to the relevant
revenue authority and credited to the tax liability of those employees. When
money is in short supply, a company can be tempted to treat these tax
installments as working capital to finance its operations, rather than
remitting them as required. If the company trades out of its financial
difficulties, no harm is done. However, if the company becomes insolvent
and fails, the loss either falls on the employee or the revenue authority. To
deter this behavior, and to provide compensation when it does occur, many
jurisdictions have now legislated to impose quite harsh liability on directors
for these unremitted tax installments.
82

C. COM. art. 242-6-2 (Fr.) imposes criminal liability for directors who give false information
relating to the financial position of the company, with the aim of hiding the truth. For the English language
version of French legislation, see http://195.83.177.9/code/index.phtml?lang=uk.
83
C. MONETAIRE ET FINANCIER art. L465-2 (Fr.).
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Australia84 has seen some significant increases in the liability for
directors for their own actions over the past fifteen years. One of the most
noteworthy is the imposition of personal liability for taxation installments
which the company has failed to remit. Briefly,85 since 1993, Australian
company directors have been potentially liable for the unremitted
installments of tax which they deduct from workers’ salaries, amongst other
things, in the event that their company does not pay them in a timely
manner.86 The Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) gives the directors
written notice of a “penalty,” equal to the amount of the unremitted tax owed
by the company.87 The director then has fourteen days to cause the company
to comply with its tax obligations or to undertake one of a number of other
specified actions,88 failing which, the director will become personally liable
to pay the amount of the penalty. While a number of defences exist, they are
difficult to establish.89 In addition, even if the director causes the company
to pay the unremitted installments to the ATO in the lead-up to insolvency,
the director will be personally liable to the Commissioner of Taxation for the
debt if the liquidator successfully claws back this preferential payment from
the ATO.90
While the introduction of these laws in 1993 caused some concern
amongst commentators,91 Australia is now in line with many other parts of
the world. For example, in Canada,92 directors may be jointly and severally
liable with the corporation for the company’s failure to deduct and remit
employees’ installments of income tax.93 Directors can avail themselves of a
84

See Wheelwright, supra note 6.
These provisions are discussed in more detail in other publications. See Stephen Barkoczy & MeiLing Barkoczy, Directors’ Liability and the New Regime for Collecting Unremitted Tax Instalments, 6
REVENUE L. J. 147 (1996); Christopher Symes, Reminiscing the Taxation Priorities in Insolvency, [2005] J.
OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX TEACHERS ASS’N 23 (2005); Patricia Blazey, Non Payment of Pay As You Go
Withholding Tax and the Implications for Company Directors, [2006] J. OF THE AUSTRALASIAN TAX
TEACHERS ASS’N 29 (2006); Helen Anderson, Directors’ Liability for Unpaid Employee Entitlements—
Suggestions for Reform Based on their Liabilities for Unremitted Taxes, 30(3) SYDNEY L. REV. 470 (2008).
86
Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOB-222AQD (Austl.).
87
Id. § 222AOE.
88
Under Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOB(1) (Austl.), these include entering into a
repayment agreement pursuant to § 222ALA, placing the company into administration, or winding the
company up.
89
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 95 ATC 4587, 4590 (Austl.).
See also Barkoczy, supra note 85.
90
Corporations Act, 2001, § 588FGA (Austl.). This is subject to a number of defences under
§ 588FGB.
91
See sources cited supra note 85.
92
See Sarra, supra note 17.
93
Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 227.1 (1985) (Can.), as amended: “(1) Where a corporation has
failed to deduct or withhold an amount as required . . . . has failed to remit such an amount or has failed to
pay an amount of tax . . . , the directors of the corporation at the time the corporation was required to
85
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due diligence defence94 where they have exercised the degree of care,
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised to
prevent the failure in comparable circumstances. Directors’ liability ceases
two years after directors cease to hold a directorship.95
In South Africa, the Income Tax Act 1962 provides for strict liability
on the part of directors with respect to unremitted employee tax installments.
It provides that “[w]here an employer is a company, every shareholder and
director who controls or is regularly involved in the management of the
company’s overall financial affairs shall be personally liable for the
employees’ tax, additional tax, penalty or interest for which the company is
liable.”96 There is no director liability for other unpaid taxes, with the
exception of value added tax. No defences are available.
In New Zealand,97 joint and several liability can be imposed on
directors for the income tax of a company. Section HD15(1) of the Income
Tax Act 2007 deals with arrangements entered into by companies which
prevent them from meeting their tax obligations. For the section to apply the
purpose of the arrangement must have been to have this effect, and then only
if, had “a director of the company at the time of the arrangement made
reasonable inquiries, they could have anticipated at the time that the income
tax liability would, or would likely, be required to be met.”98 Liability is
subject to some exclusions99 and defences.100 Section 141F of the Tax
Administration Act of 1994 also states that where any shortfall penalty is
imposed on a company and where a director fails to fulfill specified
responsibilities under taxation law, he or she may be held liable for a portion
of that shortfall penalty.

deduct, withhold, remit or pay the amount are jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable, together with the
corporation, to pay that amount and any interest or penalties relating to it.” Liability is subject under
subsection 2 to the corporation’s inability to pay, as evidence by unsatisfied execution of a registered
liability, its liquidation or assignment or bankruptcy order.
94
Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 227.1(3) (1985) (Can.) (as amended).
95
Id. ch. 1 § 227.1(4).
96
Income Tax Act of 1962 R.S.A. Sched. IV, s. 16(2C) (S. Afr.).
97
See Noonan & Watson, supra note 28.
98
Income Tax Act 2007, 2005 S.N.Z. No. 97, § HD15(1)(c)(ii) (N.Z.).
99
Id. § HD 15(2).
100
Id. § HD15(3) provides that: “All persons who are directors of the company at the time the
arrangement is entered into are treated as agents of the company in relation to the tax obligation, and the
liability is joint and several. But a director has no liability if—(a) they do not derive a benefit from the
arrangement, and at the first reasonable opportunity after becoming aware of the arrangement, or the
aspects of the arrangement that cause this section to apply to it, they record formally their dissent in relation
to the arrangement with the company and with the Commissioner; or (b) they were not at the relevant time
involved in the executive management of the company and had no knowledge of the arrangement, or the
aspects of the arrangement that cause this section to apply to it.”
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Some countries require an element of fault on the part of the director.
For example, in the United States,101 § 6672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
1954 provides that:
[A]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay
over any tax . . . . who willfully fails to collect such tax, or
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, …. shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax . . . not accounted
for and paid over. 102
The Internal Revenue Code requires that employers withhold federal income
taxes and social security taxes from their employees' wages.103 Because the
employer holds these taxes as “special fund[s] in trust for the United
States”,104 the withheld amounts are commonly referred to as “trust fund
taxes.”105 While an employer remains liable for its failure to remit trust fund
taxes, the Internal Revenue Code also imposes personal liability, in an
amount equal to an employer's deficient taxes, upon those officers or
employees responsible for collecting, accounting for, and remitting payroll
taxes, who willfully fail to do so.106
In France, any director, whether formally appointed or de facto, of any
corporation, is jointly liable with the corporation for the payment of any tax,
if, by fraudulent tactics or serious and repeated violations of tax law, he
makes the collection of taxes impossible.107 Case law has established a
number of generous defences.108 In Malaysia,109 the Director-General of
Inland Revenue may ignore transactions which have the direct or indirect
effect
of
avoiding
or
evading
tax,
pursuant
to
§ 140(1) of the Income Tax Act.
By contrast, in South Korea,110 directors are not liable, although
interestingly, shareholders who receive a distribution of the company’s
101

See Gerding, supra note 62.
See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
103
26 U.S.C. §§ 3402(a), 3102(a) (2006).
104
26 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (2006).
105
Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978).
106
See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b) (2006); see also O'Connor v. United States,
956 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1992) (outlining elements of 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2006) liability).
107
Livre des procédures fiscales, July 26, 2005, art. L 267 (Fr.).
108
These include that even if formally appointed, the director was not assuming in fact the direction
of the corporation; Cass. com., March 3, 2004, RJF 7/04, No. 792; that he had delegated his powers in the
tax field to another person; Cass. com., April 25, 2006, BF 8--9/06, Inf. 951; or that the tax was not due at
the time he was managing the corporation; id.
109
See Pascoe, supra note 64.
110
See Song, supra note 78.
102
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residual assets when the company is wound up may be liable as secondary
tax debtors for unremitted taxes,111 as may the shareholders in family-owned
companies.112 Likewise, China’s new Enterprise Income Taxation Law113
passed in 2007 does not impose any liability on directors for unpaid
corporate tax debts.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom,114 directors are not liable for
unremitted taxes. The only liability which might be imposed in such cases is
for misfeasance and disqualification on the grounds of “unfitness” under the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
In summary, some of the jurisdictions surveyed impose liability on
directors for unremitted taxation installments. Notably, the similarity, in
form or substance, present in laws relation to capital raising, does not exist
in unremitted taxation installments. Some countries such as Australia, South
Africa, and Canada, impose strict liability, with Australian and Canada
allowing defences. Other countries, such as France and the United States,
require proof of fault. Some countries have no law at all in this area.
In many countries, in order to protect the revenue base and the
operations of government, taxation legislation traditionally is onerous.
However, as a corporate stakeholder, the revenue authority is the most
highly diversified creditor imaginable, and therefore arguably the least
deserving of harsh protection legislation. The non-payment of the debts of
one or more failing companies is unlikely to cause significant financial loss.
This may explain why some jurisdictions do not impose personal liability on
directors for the recovery of these amounts. Nonetheless, liability serves an
important deterrent function, which may account for the severity of the
provisions in a number of the jurisdictions surveyed.
C.

Similarities in Environmental Protection Laws Across Selected
Jurisdictions

With increasing discussion of global warming, climate change and
carbon emissions, and in the wake of some devastating environmental
disasters caused by corporate misconduct, it is unsurprising that many
countries have widespread environment protection legislation. Unlike the
forms of liability discussed above, the harm caused by breach of
environment protection laws is not necessarily redressable purely by money
111

[National Tax Collection Act] art. 34 (S. KOR.).
[Corporate Tax Code] art. 2, Item 10 (S. KOR.).
113
Enterprise Income Taxation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.).
114
See Lowry, supra note 75.
112
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and often is not limited to a small class of plaintiffs. Perhaps in recognition
that deterrence is more important than compensation, the laws examined
below tend to impose criminal, rather than civil, liability on directors.
In Australia,115 there is extensive environmental protection
legislation.116 Some acts impose liability on directors for the faults and
defaults of their companies. Directors may face criminal prosecutions under
state legislation.117 The “positional/managerial” liability model is the most
common,118 where persons holding certain positions within a company are
liable for the company’s breach of the law. Other models of liability include
positional, managerial, responsible officer, participatory and accessorial.119
Defences are available under the statutes.120 They differ markedly
depending on the particular piece of legislation, although most commonly
include due diligence and the lack of ability of the individual to influence the
contravention because of the position he or she holds.
Canada121 is also typified by a multitude of statutes governing
environmental protection, with more than thirty statutes imposing liability
on directors for breach. Personal liability is generally imposed on those
persons who have charge, management or control of the corporation’s
activities or property, which occurs if they take an active role in the business
or if they had a duty or opportunity to take preventive or corrective action
but failed to do so.122 Directors who authorise, permit, or acquiesce in their
corporation’s offence will be liable for the same offence pursuant to many
environmental statutes in Canada.123 The applicable penalties are fines, with
imprisonment reserved for serious misconduct.124 Liability is strict, with a
115

See Wheelwright, supra note 6.
Examples of federal legislation include Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act, 1981 (Austl.);
Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act, 1983 (Austl.); Environment and Heritage
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 2003 (Austl.); World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983
(Austl.); Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act, 1981 (Austl.); Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Austl.); Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act,
1989 (Austl.).
117
These are set out in Appendix 6 of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Personal
Liability for Corporate Fault Discussion Paper, May 2005, available at http://www.camac.gov.au/
camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/Personal_Liability_DP_May05.pdf.
118
Id. at 33.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See Sarra, supra note 17.
122
See J. Sarra & R. Davis, Director and Officer Liability, in CORPORATE INSOLVENCY (Butterworths
2002).
123
See e.g., Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., c. 33 (1999) (Can.).
124
Examples of statutes that include imprisonment as a potential sanction include the Environmental
Protection Act R.S.C. (1999) (Can.); the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. c. E-19 (1990)
(Can.); the Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A., c. E-12 (2000) (Can.); and the
British Columbia Water Act, R.S.B.C. c. 483 (1996) (Can.).
116
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due diligence defence.125 This includes a requirement to establish proper
and effective preventative and reporting systems.126 Former directors may
also be liable, acknowledging the fact that environmental damage may take
some time to become evident. 127
China128 has in recent years increased its regulation of the
environment129 and has embraced international cooperation in environmental
protection.130 However, there have been a number of impediments to actual
protection of the environment, including the growth of China’s industry,
gaps in the legislation and lack of enforcement. While there is a central
body131 responsible for environmental protection, local enforcement remains
with local governments. While the persons directly responsible for a serious
environmental pollution accident are subject to administrative sanction,132
the law does not provide for the joint liability of directors in civil actions to
pay compensation to parties affected. However, China’s Criminal Law
imposes criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment133 on persons
directly responsible for violations of environmental law regarding pollution
and waste control,134 forestry law,135 and mineral resources law.136
In South Africa,137 the National Environmental Management Act 1998
imposes criminal and civil liability on directors in an unusual way. Section
34(1) provides that:
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any
provision listed in Schedule 3 and it appears that such person
has by that offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state
or other person, including the cost incurred or likely to be
incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating the environment
125

R. v. Bata Industries Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 236 (Can.) (Ont.).
Id.
127
See e.g., Environmental Management Act, S.B.C., c. 53, § 47(1) (2003).
128
See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, supra note 38.
129
The National People's Congress has since 1949 passed 9 laws on environmental protection and 15
laws on the protection of natural resources. See Environmental Protection in China (1996-2005), a white
paper released by the State Council in June 2006, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/
MATERIAL/170257.htm.
130
China has acceded to more than 50 international conventions on environmental protection. See id.
131
The State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”).
132
Environmental Protection Law (1989) art. 38 (promulgated by Order No. 22 of the President of the
P.R.C., Dec. 26, 1989, effective on the date of promulgation) (P.R.C.).
133
Criminal Law (1999) arts. 338-346 (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the P.R.C.,
Mar. 14, 1997.adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 1, 1979, amended at
the Fifth Session of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997) (P.R.C.)
134
Id. arts. 338 and 339.
135
Id. art. 344.
136
Id. art. 343.
137
Van der Linde, supra note 46.
126
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or preventing damage to the environment, the court
may . . . inquire summarily and without pleadings into the
amount of the loss or damage so caused.
Directors are named in subsection 8 as parties who may be so convicted.
Subsection 7 states that directors are guilty “if the offence in question
resulted from the failure of the director to take all reasonable steps that were
necessary under the circumstances to prevent the commission of the
offence”; the burden of disproving this lies with the director.138
In the United Kingdom,139 protection of the environment is governed
mainly by the Environmental Protection Act 1990.140 The HM Inspectorate
of Pollution or the local authority Environmental Health Officer may take
action against directors, as well as the company, for breaches of the law.141
Criminal penalties include both fines and imprisonment, as well as
disqualification from acting as a director.142
In Hong Kong,143 there are a range of ordinances imposing criminal
liability for damage to the environment, or failure to protect the natural and
cultural environment.144 In addition, future impact on the environment is
138

National Environmental Management Act of 1998 s. 34(7) (S. Afr.) concludes with the words:
“Provided that proof of the said offence by the firm shall constitute prima facie evidence that the director is
guilty under this subsection.”
139
Lowry, supra note 75.
140
See also Environment Act, 1995, c. 25 (U.K.), The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/437 (U.K.), and The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, 1999,
S.I. 1999/743 (U.K.).
141
This may be done pursuant to the United Kingdom Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §
157(1), which provides that: “Where an offence under any provision of this Act committed by a body
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable
to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate
or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty
of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”
142
The Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 2 (U.K.) provides that the court may,
in its discretion, issue a “disqualification order against a person convicted of an indictable offence (whether
on indictment or summarily) in connection with the promotion, formation, management liquidation or
striking off of a company with the receivership of a company’s property or with his being an administrative
receiver of a company.” The offence does not have to relate to the actual management of the company
provided it was committed in “connection” with its management.
143
Goo et al., supra note 54.
144
For damage to the environment, see the Air Pollution Control Ordinance, (1983, as amended
1991) Cap. 311. (H.K.); Water Pollution Control Ordinance, (1981) Cap. 358. (H.K.); Dumping at Sea
Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 466. (H.K.); and Merchant Shipping (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 413. (H.K.). For the specific problem of oil pollution, see Merchant Shipping
(Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution) Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 414. (H.K.); Noise Control
Ordinance, (1989, as amended 1992 and 1996) Cap. 400. (H.K.); Civil Aviation (Aircraft Noise)
Ordinance, (1986) Cap. 312. (H.K.); and Waste Disposal Ordinance, (1980, as amended 1985, 1989, and
1992) Cap. 354. (H.K.). For failure to protect the natural environment, see Animals and Plants (Protection
of Endangered Species) Ordinance, (1976, as amended 2006) Cap. 187. (H.K.); Marine Fish Culture
Ordinance, (1980, as amended 1982) Cap. 353. (H.K.); Wild Animals Protection Ordinance, (1976) Cap.
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governed by the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance,145 where
developers must indicate the likely impact of their plans upon the
environment. The criminal liability of certain persons, including directors of
companies, is provided for under § 29(1).146
Malaysia147 also has environmental laws, such as the Environmental
Quality Act 1974, which impose criminal liability upon directors for
breaches committed by their companies. Section 43(1) of the Act deems
directors to be liable for the environmental offences of their company unless
one of the defences contained in that subsection applies.148
In South Korea,149 environmental protection is now heavily
regulated.150 Companies may be criminally liable for breaches.151 While
there are no provisions imposing civil liability on companies, directors may
be liable for the amount of any criminal penalty imposed on their company if
that penalty is attributable to a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty,
dependent on proof of negligence or intent to commit the violation.
Directors are not liable in the absence of personal fault, even where the
relevant statute imposes strict liability on the company.152
The United States153 has the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).154 This federal statute,
170. (H.K.); Whaling Industry (Regulation) Ordinance, (1996) Cap. 496. (H.K.); and Forests and
Countryside Ordinance, (1937, as amended 1974) Cap. 96. (H.K.). For failure to protect the cultural
environment, see Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, (1976) Cap. 53. (H.K.). All of the previous are
available at Hong Kong Ordinances, http://www.hklii.hk/hk/legis/ord/.
145
Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, (1998) Cap. 499. (H.K.).
146
Hong Kong Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, (1998) Cap. 499, § 29(1) provides that:
“Where a person convicted of an offence under this Ordinance is a body corporate and it is proved that the
offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect or omission on
the part of, a director, manager, secretary or other person concerned in the management of the body
corporate, the director, manager, secretary or other person also commits the offence.”
147
Pascoe, supra note 64.
148
Environmental Quality Act, (1974) § 43(1) (Malay.). These include lack of knowledge and
consent, and that the directors exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.
149
Song, supra note 78.
150
More than 20 laws regulate environmental issues, in areas such as noise, air, soil, water, sewage,
and the preservation of nature. See, e.g., [Framework Act on Environmental Policy, Law No. 4257] (1990)
(S. KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 8471 of 2007); [Clean Air Conservation Act, Law No. 4262] (1990) (S.
KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 7779 of 2005); [Water Quality Conservation Act, Law No. 7459] (2005)
(S.
KOR.);
[Natural
Environment
Conservation
Act,
Law
No.
7297]
(2004)
(S. KOR) (last revised by Law No. 8468 of 2007); [Soil Environment Conservation Act, Law No. 4906]
(1995) (S. KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 7459 of 2005). For a short history of the development of South
Korean environmental law, see Hong Sik Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, 29 ENVTL. L.
501 (1964).
151
For instance, [Act on Fundamentals on Environmental Policy] art. 31 (S. KOR.) provides that an
enterprise must pay damages if the pollution is caused by the enterprise. See also [Act on Preservation of
Soil Environment] art. 10-3(1) (S. KOR.).
152
[Commercial Code] § 399(1) (S. KOR.).
153
Gerding, supra note 62.
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passed in 1980 following a major environmental disaster,155 imposes
extensive and complicated liability on directors in relation to land
contaminated with hazardous waste. Liability attaches to owners and
operators, including individual persons, of sites from where such material is
released into the environment.156 However, courts have taken different
approaches to the definition of “operators.” The most common approach has
been to hold directors liable as “operators” for violations in which they
directly participate.157 While some courts have held directors liable for
contraventions of the law where they had the “capacity to control” those
operations, even if they did not know of, or directly participate in, those
contraventions,158 Moore notes that “[a] clear majority of courts that have
considered the issue claim to adhere to a test for "actual control.”159
In France,160 directors may be criminally liable under the Code de
l’environnement for a range of crimes.161 These include lesser strict liability
offences, as well as more serious crimes under the Code de l’environnement
which require negligence or intent. An example of the latter is water
pollution.162
In summary, while many countries have adopted environmental
protection laws, the format of the laws differs, most notably in South Africa
and South Korea. Some countries, such as Australia and Canada, impose
both criminal and civil liability based on the position held, but subject to
defences. Others confine their reach to criminal liability, with a range of
fault requirements.

154

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2008).
The Love Canal disaster. See also MICHAEL BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF
AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS (Pantheon Books 1979).
156
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3) (2008).
157
Bryan Moore, The Corporate Officer as CERCLA Operator: Applying the Holding in United
States v. Bestfoods to the Determination of Officer Liability, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 519, 526-28 (1999). For
further discussion of CERCLA’s interaction with corporate law principles, see Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy
A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259
(1992); Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for
Environmental Hazards, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1993); Gerding, supra note 62.
158
This is also known as the “authority to control” test. See Moore, supra note 157, at 533-40. He
distinguishes cases in which courts based director and officer liability determination on whether the
individual had “actual control” over hazardous substances from those that used an “authority to control”
test. Id. 529-40.
159
Id. at 529.
160
Mauro, supra note 81.
161
See, e.g., C. ENVIRONNEMENT arts. L218-20, L218-22, and L218-50.
162
Law No. 2000-916 of September 19, 2000, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], September 22, 2000.
155
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Conclusion on Similarities of Laws in Selected Jurisdictions

The discussion above highlights similarities in legislation relating to
capital raising, unremitted tax installments, and protection of the
environment, across a range of selected jurisdictions. There is a general
obligation on companies to produce disclosure documentation in relation to
capital offerings to the public, and directors are liable for errors in, and
omissions from, such documents. Defences are usually available, but are
generally limited to due diligence, reliance on the advice of an expert, or
lack of consent to the issuing of the prospectus. Nonetheless, there are some
local variations to both the format of the personal and criminal liability
provisions and the defences available. This illustrates the point that there are
multiple ways for laws to be drafted to meet a common legislative objective.
This pattern continues for unremitted taxes. Most, but not all, of the
countries surveyed have laws making directors liable for the unremitted tax
installments taken from employees’ wages. Again, there are defences.
However, some jurisdictions require some element of intent on the part of
the directors, making such laws somewhat harder to make out than those
relating to capital raising. The diversity between countries is more
pronounced, and some countries such as the United Kingdom do not
legislate on this matter at all.
In relation to the protection of the environment, most of the countries
surveyed impose criminal liability on directors for their companies’ actions;
however, not all impose civil liability, and the mechanism for finding
directors liable differs between strict liability based on position but subject
to defences and liability based on actual involvement or fault.
III.

DIVERSITY IN DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY LAWS BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS

This Part examines three areas in which there are marked differences
in the law: insolvent trading, protection of employee entitlements, and
compensation of tort claimants. These three areas involve laws for the
protection of vulnerable corporate stakeholders. Two observations can be
made about laws in the jurisdictions surveyed: the first is that they generally
do not provide adequate protection of these stakeholder cohorts, and the
second is that the inadequacy of this protection is exhibited in different ways
across the jurisdictions. This is in stark contrast to, for example, the
protection of prospective investors, where the law is both stringent and
noticeably similar across jurisdictions.
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A. Diversity in Insolvent Trading Laws in Selected Jurisdictions
Creditors such as banks are largely insulated from corporate failure by
holding security over company assets. However, the priority held by
secured creditors significantly impacts upon the ability of unsecured
creditors to recover when a company becomes insolvent. Unsecured
claimants must take their chances of receiving a small payment after the
satisfaction of the claims of preferred creditors.163
The risk of non-payment is one of the consequences of dealing with a
limited liability entity and is generally known and understood by unsecured
creditors. Whether this risk can be adequately compensated ex ante is the
subject of much law and economics literature. Compensation mechanisms
include the ability to diversify away the risk of loss by investing in multiple
companies, and to charge a premium on the price of goods, services or credit
supplied, sufficient to cover the risk of loss. Because small trade creditors in
many instances lack the ability to self-protect by these mechanisms, they are
vulnerable to the risk of non-payment in the event of their debtor’s
insolvency. Their loss can have flow-on effects for their own employees and
creditors.
Understandably, there is no legislation that allows for the recovery
from directors or shareholders of unpaid debts incurred whilst the company
is solvent. This undermines the concept of limited liability and the separate
legal entity of the company. However, one might expect that the
vulnerability of unsecured creditors would justify widespread legislative
intervention where the company incurred the debts when it was insolvent.
This is not the case. The survey of the jurisdictions outlined below shows
that some have laws which are difficult to enforce and others have no
legislation on this matter at all.
In Australia,164 the Corporations Act 2001 imposes both personal
liability, and in some cases, criminal penalties, on directors who allow their
company to trade whilst insolvent.165 Section 588G(1) imposes liability on
directors for the company’s debt, where:
(a) a person is a director of a company at the time when the
company incurs a debt; and

163

These typically include the costs of the liquidation and the payment of employees’ entitlements.
Wheelwright, supra note 6.
165
This is in addition to directors’ duties to the company under the Corporations Act, 2001,
c. 2D, pt. 2D.1 (Austl.).
164
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(b) the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes
insolvent by incurring that debt, or by incurring at that time
debts including that debt; and
(c) at that time, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the company is insolvent, or would so become insolvent, as
the case may be . . .
....
(2) By failing to prevent the company from incurring the
debt, the person contravenes this section if:
(a) the person is aware at that time that there are such
grounds for so suspecting; or
(b) a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the
company's circumstances would be so aware.
In addition to being civilly liable, the director commits a criminal offence if
the director’s failure to prevent the company incurring the debt is
dishonest.166 Courts have a range of options in relation to contraventions of
§ 588G. In addition to holding the directors liable for the debts of the
company from the commencement of insolvent trading, they may impose on
directors pecuniary penalties,167 banning orders,168 and compensation
orders.169 Defences are available under § 588H.
However, several aspects of the legislation have created problems.170
The liquidation requirement means that directors can escape liability by
placing the company into voluntary administration. If the liquidator chooses
not to take action to enforce the provision, creditors face a number of
procedural hurdles before they themselves can sue.171

166

Corporations Act, 2001, c. 5, pt. 5.7B, § 588G(3) (Austl.).
Corporations Act, 2001, c. 9, Pt. 9.4B, § 1317G (Austl.).
168
Corporations Act, 2001, c. 2D, Pt. 2D.6, § 206B (Austl.) (banning orders disqualify a person from
managing a corporation in specified circumstances).
169
Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 588J, 1317H (Austl.). An order may be sought by the regulator, or by
the company’s liquidator. Note that the compensation is payable to the company and not to individual
creditors.
170
An example is the definition of insolvency, and whether the commercial reality of a company
being able to borrow more money affects its solvency. See, e.g., Powell v. Fryer [2000] S.A.S.C. 97;
Southern Cross Interiors Party Ltd. (In Liq) v. Deputy Comm’r of Taxation [2001] 165 F.L.R. 430; Lewis
v. Doran [2004] 184 F.L.R. 454. Cf. Emanuel Management Party Ltd. v. Fosters Brewing Group Ltd.
[2003] 178 F.L.R. 1. See also HELEN ANDERSON, CORPORATE DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY TO CREDITORS 148152 (Lawbook Co. 2006).
171
Corporations Act, 2001, c. 5, Pt. 5.7B, §§ 588R-U (Austl.).
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The United Kingdom172 does not have insolvent trading as such. Its
legislation affords a dual approach, targeting both fraudulent trading as well
as wrongful trading. The former is imposed by § 213 of the Insolvency
Act,173 which provides that:
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears
that any business of the company has been carried on with
intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any
other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the following has
effect.
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator may declare
that any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on
of the business in the manner above-mentioned are to be liable
to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as
the court thinks proper.
Fraud for the purposes of § 213 has been defined as requiring “actual
dishonesty involving, according to current notions of fair trading among
commercial men at the present day, real moral blame.”174 In Re William C
Leitch Brothers Ltd.,175 Maugham J. stipulated that this occurs “when there
is to the knowledge of the directors no reasonable prospect of the creditors
ever receiving payment of those debts.”176 This includes turning a blind eye,
where there is a suspicion of the relevant facts together with a deliberate
decision to avoid confirming their existence.177 Criminal liability also
applies.178 The difficulties in making out the requirements of “actual
dishonesty” and “real moral blame” led to the enactment of the wrongful
trading provisions, following recommendations by the Jenkins Committee179
and the Cork Committee.180
Wrongful trading, which is governed by § 214 of the Insolvency Act
1986, is considerably more involved than fraudulent trading. There is the
172

Lowry, supra note 75.
Insolvency Act, 1986, § 213 (U.K.).
174
In Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd., [1933] Ch. 786, 790.
175
In Re William C. Leitch Brothers, Ltd., [1932] 2 Ch. 71. Cf. Re Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd.,
[1986] B.C.C. 98904.
176
Id. at 77. See also Welham v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] A.C. 103; Bernasconi v.
Nicholas Bennett & Co., [2000] B.C.C. 921; Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v. Brother, [2000] 1
H.K.L.R.D. 568; Regina v. Grantham, [1984] Q.B. 675.
177
Morris v. State Bank of India, [2005] 2 B.C.L.C. 328.
178
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 993 (U.K.).
179
BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749, 195 (U.K.).
180
BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1981,
Cmnd. 8558, c. 44 (U.K.)
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same requirement that the company be wound up in insolvent liquidation,
and a person who was a director at that time “is to be liable to make such
contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper.”181
Directors may not escape liability by being a “sleeping” director,182 or
through ignorance, either of the facts of the company’s insolvency, or of the
basic183 financial and accounting knowledge necessary to fulfill their
obligations.184
But unlike fraudulent trading, the wrongful trading section requires
that the director “knew or ought to have concluded that there was no
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent
liquidation,”185 unless the court is satisfied that the director “took every step
with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors as
(assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have
taken.”186 The relevant standard is of a “reasonably diligent person having
both—(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably
be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by
that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill
and experience that that director has.”187
Malaysia,188 like the United Kingdom, imposes liability for both
wrongful and fraudulent trading. Breach of the wrongful trading provision,
§ 303(3) of the Companies Act 1965, is both a civil wrong and a crime
attracting serious fines and possible imprisonment.189 It states:
If in the course of the winding up of a company or in any
proceedings against a company it appears that an officer of the
company who was knowingly a party to the contracting of a
debt had, at the time the debt was contracted, no reasonable or
probable ground of expectation, after taking into consideration
the other liabilities, if any, of the company at the time, of the
company being able to pay the debt, the officer shall be guilty
of an offence against this Act.
181

Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (U.K.).
Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd., [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 275, 309.
183
Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (U.K.).
184
Re DKG Contractors Ltd., [1990] B.C.C. 903, 912.
185
Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214(2)(b) (U.K.).
186
Id. § 214(3).
187
Id. § 214.
188
Pascoe, supra note 64.
189
Companies Act, § 303(3) (1965) (Malay.). Breach attracts a penalty of imprisonment for one year
or a fine of 5,000 Ringgit.
182
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Section 304(2) provides for directors’ liability, stating that:
Where a person has been convicted of an offence under
subsection 303(3) in relation to the contracting of such a
debt . . . the Court, on the application of the liquidator or any
creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper
so to do, declare that the person shall be personally responsible
without any limitation of liability for the payment of the whole
or any part of that debt.
Possible recovery under the section is limited. The applicant needs to prove
that the director knowingly participated in the incurrence of the debt and that
the director had no reasonable or probable ground to expect that the
company could pay it.190 In addition, by making criminal liability a
prerequisite for civil liability, the criminal burden of proof is imposed onto
the recovery by the liquidator or creditor. There are also criminal sanctions
for those who “knowingly” carry on the business of the company with the
intent to defraud creditors.191 Here, civil recovery is not linked to a criminal
conviction, but the requirement to prove an intent to defraud is a significant
hurdle.192
Like the United Kingdom, Hong Kong193 allows for directors’ liability
for fraudulent trading, but it has not adopted the more recent wrongful
trading provisions of its former colonial governors. Section 275(1) of the
Companies Ordinance194 provides that:
If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that
any business of the company has been carried on with intent to
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other
person or for any fraudulent purpose, the court, on the
application of the Official Receiver, or the liquidator or any
creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper
so to do, declare that any persons who were knowingly parties
to the carrying on of the business in manner aforesaid shall be
personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all
or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the
court may direct.
190

Id.
Id. §§ 304(1), 304(5).
192
There is one reported case: H. Rosen Engineering B.V. v. Siow Yoon Keong [1997] 1 C.L.J. 137,
1 A.M.R. 157 (Malay.).
193
Goo et al., supra note 54.
194
Companies
Ordinance,
(1997)
Cap.
32,
§
275(1)
(H.K.),
available
at
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/32/s275.html.
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The British definition of fraud applies in Hong Kong, so that directors are
liable if there is proof that they knew or ought to have known that there was
no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation.195
This is a question of fact resolved by asking whether the director’s decision
to continue to trade involved unnecessary risks to the repayment of
creditors.196 Section 275(3) of the Companies Ordinance imposes criminal
liability.
New Zealand197 also has laws against fraudulent trading.198 Liability
is provided for in § 380(2) of the Companies Act.199 Due to the purpose
requirement in this section, it is not targeted at directors whose only
motivation is to save the company, regardless of whether that aim was
unrealistic.200 Section 135 deals with reckless trading,201 imposing a duty,
objectively assessed, on directors to supervise the company’s business.202
Section 136 imposes an overlapping duty, providing that: “[a] director of a
company must not agree to the company incurring an obligation unless the
director believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be
able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so.”
South Africa203 takes a different approach, by including both
fraudulent and reckless trading in one section. Section 424 of the
Companies Act 1973 imposes personal liability on directors, by providing
that:
195

In Re William C. Leitch Ltd., [1932] 2 Ch. 71, see also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sec’y of State for Trade and Indus. v. Gash, [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 341; Re Amaron Ltd.,
[1998] B.C.C. 264; Re Park House Properties Ltd., [1998] B.C.C. 847; Re McNulty’s Interchange Ltd. &
Anor., [1988] 4 B.C.C. 533; Sec’y of State for Trade and Indus. v. Joiner Re Synthetic Tech. Ltd., [1993]
B.C.C. 549.
197
Noonan & Watson, supra note 28.
198
Companies Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 105, § 380(1) (N.Z.) makes it an offence for directors to
carry on business with an intent to defraud creditors or any other person or for a fraudulent purpose. In
addition, § 33 of the Companies Amendment Act 2006, 2006 S.N.Z. No. 56 (N.Z.) makes it an offence for
directors who, with intent to defraud a creditor or creditors, do anything that causes material loss to any
creditor.
199
Companies Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. 105 § 380(2) (N.Z.): “Every director of a company who,—(a)
By false pretences or other fraud induces a person to give credit to the company; or (b) With intent to
defraud creditors of the company,—(i) Gives, transfers, or causes a charge to be given on, property of the
company to any person; or (ii) Causes property to be given or transferred to any person; or (iii) Caused or
was a party to execution being levied against property of the company—commits an offence and is liable
on conviction to the penalties set out in § 373(4) of this Act.”
200
See Re Nimbus Trawling Co. Ltd., [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) (N.Z.); Keegan v. Page Vivian
Motors Ltd., [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 308 (C.A.) (N.Z.).
201
“A director of a company must not—(a) Agree to the business of the company being carried on in
a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors; or (b) Cause or allow
the business of the company to be carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to
the company’s creditors.”
202
See Mason v. Lewis, [2006] 3 N.Z.L.R. 225 (C.A.) (N.Z.).
203
Van der Linde, supra note 46.
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When it appears, . . . that any business of the company was or is
being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of
the company or creditors of any other person or for any
fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the application of the
Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor or
member or contributory of the company, declare that any person
who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in
the manner aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, without
any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other
liabilities of the company as the Court may direct.204
Intent is a key issue. In order to qualify as reckless the business must be
carried on with a minimum of gross negligence, while the minimum
requirement for fraudulent trading is intent in the form of dolus eventualis.205
Trading whilst insolvent is not sufficient on its own to constitute
recklessness or fraud; nonetheless, where a company continues to incur
debts when a reasonable person in business would have realized that there
was no reasonable prospect that the creditors would receive payment when
due, courts will draw an inference of recklessness.206 The director can be
held liable for “all or any” of the debts of the company,207 and there is no
need to prove a causal connection between the reckless or fraudulent
carrying on of the business and the debt or debts for which liability is sought
to be imposed.208 Criminal liability may also be imposed.209
In France,210 the Code de commerce contains arguably very harsh
provisions on directors in the event of a company’s insolvency. Article
L 651-2 of the Code de commerce imposes liability for any director,
204

Companies Act of 1973 s. 424 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.acts.co.za/company/index.htm.
Dolus eventualis (indirect intention) exists when the possibility of a particular consequence or
circumstance is foreseen, and there is a reckless disregard as to whether it ensues or not. The person knows
that the action—or the consequences of the action—are wrong. See C. G. VAN DER MERWE & J. E. DU
PLESSIS, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 304 (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2004).
206
See Ozinsky NO v Lloyd and Others 1995 (2) SA 915 (A) (S. Afr.); Philotex (Pty) Ltd. v Snyman,
Braitex (Pty) Ltd. v. Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Terblanche NO v Damji 2003 (5) SA 489
(C) (S. Afr.).
207
Companies Act of 1973 s. 424(1) (S. Afr.).
208
According to Saincic v Industro-Clean (Pty) Ltd. 2006 SCA 77JOL 17559 (SCA) (S. Afr.), the
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa “held in Philotex (Pty) Ltd. v. Snyman, Braitex (Pty) Ltd. v.
Snyman, 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) at 142 H-I, that it is not necessary to prove a causal link between the
relevant conduct and the debts or liabilities for which there is a declaration of personal liability in terms of
s. 424. But the absence of such a proven link is a factor to be taken into consideration by the court in the
exercise of its discretion and in order to decide whether such a declaration is, in all the circumstances, just
and equitable.” Philotex was distinguished on the facts in Saincic.
209
Companies Act of 1973 s. 424(3) (S. Afr.).
210
See Mauro, supra note 81.
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amongst others, where the insolvency of the company is partly or entirely
due to a director’s fault in management. It provides:
Where the rescission of a safeguard or of a reorganization plan
or the liquidation of a legal entity reveals an excess of liabilities
over assets, the court may, in instances where management fault
has contributed to the excess of liabilities over assets, decide
that the debts of the legal entity will be borne, in whole or in
part, by all or some of the de jure or de facto managers, who
have contributed to the management fault. If there are several
managers, the court may, by way of a reasoned ruling, declare
them jointly and severally liable. The right of action shall be
barred after three years from the date of issuance of the order
pronouncing the liquidation proceedings or the rescission of the
plan. Sums paid by the managers in compliance with the first
paragraph shall form part of the debtor's assets. These sums
shall be distributed to all creditors on a pro rata basis.211
In addition, Article L 653-2 of the Code de commerce allows the court to
disqualify the director from holding that office in any other company for a
maximum of fifteen years.212 Further criminal liability is found in Article L
654-2 Code de commerce where the director commits certain crimes during
the company’s bankruptcy.213 These include embezzlement, concealing the
company’s property or increasing the insolvency of the company. If these
same acts take place before the insolvency starts, they constitute a misuse of
company assets and the director is liable for breach of his fiduciary duties.
214

In China,215 there is no insolvent trading liability as such. However,
there are a number of provisions relating to insolvency that act to protect
creditors. China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,216 which came into effect on
June 1, 2007, lifts the corporate veil, imposing liability on directors of
insolvent companies where breaches of fiduciary duties cause the
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C. COM. art. L 651-2.
C. COM. art. L 653-2, 11.
213
C. COM. art. L 654-2, 3. The law establishes a maximum term of 5 years imprisonment and 75,000
euro fine.
214
C. COM art. L 242-6 § 3.
215
See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, supra note 38.
216
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, Aug. 27, 2006,
effective June 1, 2007) (P.R.C.) replaced the State Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Trial Implementation)
(1986). See generally Chau E. Jin & Clifford C. Shanhai, The Reform of PRC Corporate Bankruptcy Law:
Slowly but Surely, 16(8) CHINA L. & PRAC. 19 (2002).
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liquidation.217 Disqualification orders may also be sought against directors,
and the company’s administrator can claw back assets which were diverted
to avoid the reach of creditors.218 Similarly, the administrator may recover
assets embezzled by directors and managers, and these directors may be
ordered to pay compensation to creditors whose interests have been
harmed.219 In addition, a range of criminal penalties apply.220
As in China, there is no specific liability for insolvent trading in South
Korea.221 Liability to a third party is only imposed on a director where loss
is incurred as a result of the director’s neglect of his or her duties to the
company, if such neglect results from wrongful intent or gross negligence.222
This includes the behavior of directors during periods of financial difficulty,
if such behavior interferes with the company’s ability to pay its debts.
In summary, a superficial examination of the provisions outlined
above might give the impression that there is extensive civil and criminal
legislation governing insolvent trading. However, the requirements of proof
of knowledge and, in some cases, intent, the availability of defences, and a
variety of procedural hurdles significantly affect the effectiveness of these
forms of creditor protection. It is interesting to note that both Canada and
the United States lack federal statutory law governing insolvent trading.
B.

Diversity in Employee Entitlements Laws in Selected Jurisdictions

When companies collapse, employees can miss out on entitlements,
including unpaid wages, holiday pay, redundancy payments, pay in lieu of
long-service leave, and superannuation contributions. Employees are even
more vulnerable to corporate failure than unsecured creditors for two
reasons. First, they lack the ability to diversify the investment of their labor
by holding multiple jobs, and second, they not only lose the amounts owed
to them but also their wages from week to week.

217
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, Aug. 27, 2006, effective
June 1, 2007), art. 125, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.).
218
Id. arts. 33-34.
219
Id. art. 36.
220
Criminal Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 27, Dec, 25, 1999, effective Dec. 25, 2007)
(amended 1999), art. 168, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.) provides that where an
employee of a state-owned company or enterprise is gravely derelict in the exercise of his or her duties or is
abusing his or her powers, causing bankruptcy or heavy losses to the company or enterprise which results
in heavy losses of the state’ interests, he or she shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more
than three years or criminal detention, or to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not
more than seven years in very serious cases.
221
See Song, supra note 78.
222
[Commercial Code, Act No. 5591] art. 401-2 § (1)-(2) (1998) (S. KOR.).
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Because of this vulnerability, as well as the strength in some countries
of the trade union movement, it might be expected that corporations statutes
would provide comprehensive protection of employee entitlements.
However, this is not the case.
In Australia,223 employees, although unsecured creditors, enjoy a
small measure of priority in distributions made by the liquidator when a
company fails and is wound up in liquidation.224 However, this priority may
not be sufficient to ensure their proper compensation.225 As a result of a
public outcry in the wake of a series of prominent corporate failures,
Australia introduced two measures for the protection of employees.
The first is Part 5.8A of the Corporations Act,226 which enables the
liquidator to recover compensation from a “person”227 who has entered into
an agreement or transaction with the intention of preventing the recovery of
entitlements of employees of a company, or of significantly reducing the
amounts of entitlements that can be recovered.228 Criminal penalties also
apply.229 While the provision may appear harsh, the requirement to prove
subjective intent significantly diminishes its effectiveness. There has not
been a single successful claim under these provisions in the eight years since
the legislation was introduced. In addition, while employees themselves
may take action against a director with respect to their loss, they require the
liquidator’s permission and must wait six months or more after the company
has commenced winding up.230
The ineffectiveness of this legislation prompted a taxpayer-funded
scheme called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme
(“GEERS”), which pays a portion of the entitlements of employees that have
been lost upon their employer’s liquidation.231 While this scheme is
beneficial to employees, it arguably undermines the incentive for directors to
223

See Wheelwright, supra note 6.
Corporations Act, 2001, No. 50, part 5.6, div. 6, sub. div. D § 556 (Austl.) (as amended). In the
United States, liquidation is known as bankruptcy.
225
Priority in winding up means that the liquidator ensures that creditors in designated categories
under § 556 are paid their entitlements before lower ranked creditors are paid anything. The existence of
General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (“GEERS”), discussed infra note 231 and
accompanying text, provides evidence of the fact that in many cases, the employees of a company are
insufficiently compensated by virtue of their priority when the company is wound up.
226
Corporations Act, 2001, Part 5.8A, § 596AA-AI (Austl.) (as amended) (This was inserted into the
Corporations Act by the Corporations Law Amendment (Employee Entitlements) Act, 2000 (Austl.).)
227
Id. § 596AC. This term is not defined for the purpose of this section, but includes a director.
228
Id. § 596AB.
229
Id. part 9.4, div. 2 § 1311, Sched. 3. These are a fine of up to $110,000 or imprisonment for 10
years, or both.
230
Id. part 5.8A, § 596AG.
231
See
generally
GEERS
http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Programmes/Employee
Entitlements/GEERSV2/ (last visited May 6, 2008). There are limits on what employees may recover.
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make adequate provision for employee entitlements prior to the company’s
insolvency.
Canada,232 by way of contrast, has considerably more generous
provisions than Australia. Federal, provincial and territorial statutes specify
that directors may be held personally liable for employee entitlements233 for
a prescribed period.234
The provisions become relevant when the
corporation fails to pay these entitlements, usually in the lead up to
insolvency.235 Section 119(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act
1985 (“CBCA”) is an example:
Directors of a corporation are jointly and severally, or
solidarily, liable to employees of the corporation for all debts
not exceeding six months wages payable to each such employee
for services performed for the corporation while they are such
directors respectively.236
Pursuant to § 119(3), the director must be sued within two years after
ceasing to be a director.237 A due diligence defence applies under the
CBCA.238 Directors who pay employee entitlements under these provisions
are then subrogated to the rights of the employees in terms of priority of
recovery from the company’s liquidated assets.239
Section 234(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 governs
liability with respect to certain unpaid employee entitlements in New
Zealand. The section provides:

232

See Sarra, supra note 17.
See Barrette v. Crabtree Estate, [1993] 1 S.C.R 1027 (Can.). However, severance pay is not
included. It is considered to be a payment arising from breach of contract, and not from services rendered.
However, where a collective agreement guarantees the payment of severance pay on dismissal based on a
formula of service, it may be included in the claim against the directors. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Scott,
[1985] C.A. 713, 32 B.L.R. 1 (Can.).
234
See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-44 (1985). Related compensation can
include vacation pay and guaranteed bonuses. Mills-Hughes et al. v. Raynor et al., [1988] 63 O.R.2d 343,
730(n) (Can.).
235
The Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 § 119(2) (1985) provides that: “A
director is not liable under subsection (1) unless (a) the corporation has been sued for the debt within six
months after it has become due and execution has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (b) the
corporation has commenced liquidation and dissolution proceedings or has been dissolved and a claim for
the debt has been proved within six months after the earlier of the date of commencement of the liquidation
and dissolution proceedings and the date of dissolution; or (c) the corporation has made an assignment or a
bankruptcy order has been made against it under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and a claim for the
debt has been proved within six months after the date of the assignment or bankruptcy order.”
236
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-44, § 119(1) (1985).
237
Id. § 119(3).
238
Id. § 123.
239
Id. § 119(5).
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Where . . . the Labour Inspector establishes on the balance of
probabilities that the amount claimed in the action by way of
minimum wages or holiday pay240 or both is, if judgment is
given for that amount, unlikely to be paid in full, whether
because—
(a) the company is in receivership or liquidation; or
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
company does not have sufficient assets to pay that amount in
full,—
the Authority may authorise the Labour Inspector to
bring an action for the recovery of that amount against any
officer, director, or agent of the company who has directed or
authorised the default in payment of the minimum wages or
holiday pay or both.241
Liability is joint and several,242 and is initiated by Labour Inspector
commencing proceedings in the Employment Relations Authority against the
company for the payment of the relevant amounts. The Employment
Relations Authority then has discretion to authorise the Labour Inspector to
bring the recovery action against the director.
In South Africa, employers are required to withhold and pay over
contributions on behalf of their employees, pursuant to the Unemployment
Insurance Contributions Act 2002. Directors are personally liable for any
amount withheld and not paid over, in addition to penalties.243 There are no
defences available.244
In Hong Kong,245 directors are not liable for unpaid employee
entitlements upon corporate insolvency. Where employees are owed wages
and other specified entitlements,246 the Protection of Wages on Insolvency
Ordinance may make ex gratia payments to applicants.247 A fund established
under § 6 of that Ordinance is made up of business registration fees248 and
other specified monies.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom,249 the
240
These are provided for under the Minimum Wages Act 1983, 1983 S.N.Z. No. 115 (N.Z.) or the
Holidays Act 2003, 2003 S.N.Z No. 129 (N.Z.).
241
Employment Relations Act 2000, 2000 S.N.Z. No. 24, § 234(2) (N.Z.).
242
Id. § 234(3).
243
Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act of 2002 s. 7(4) (S. Afr.).
244
Id.
245
See Goo et al., supra note 54.
246
These are wages in lieu of notice and severance pay.
247
Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance, (1985) Cap. 380, § 16. (H.K.).
248
These are paid under the Business Registration Ordinance, (1997) Cap 310, § 21. (H.K.).
249
See Lowry, supra note 75.
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Employment Rights Act of 1996250 establishes the National Insurance Fund.
This pays amounts of unpaid wages, accrued entitlements, payment in lieu of
notice, and redundancy pay.
In summary, there is little legislation to ensure the protection of
employee entitlements across the jurisdictions surveyed, and what legislation
there is, with the exception of Canada, is inadequate to ensure these
vulnerable corporate stakeholders are compensated for their losses. It is
noteworthy that a number of jurisdictions, such as Australia, the United
Kingdom, and Hong Kong, have introduced taxpayer-funded schemes to
provide partial compensation to unpaid employees upon corporate
insolvency.
C.

Diversity in Tort Laws in Selected Jurisdictions

Next, this article briefly examines tort law across jurisdictions. It is
presented as a contrast to the varied statutory provisions examined above.
Interestingly, in the absence of individual national legislation, some of the
Commonwealth countries discussed above have developed law which is an
amalgam of the case law decided in these countries. However, the weakness
of this development is that there is general dissatisfaction with the state of
the law, as well as confusion as to the appropriate test to apply in any given
situation. South Africa, by way of contrast, avoids all of the judicial
gymnastics of the Commonwealth countries by imposing liability on
directors regardless of the fact that their actions were undertaken in their
capacities as directors.
Like unsecured creditors and employees, tort creditors are vulnerable
corporate stakeholders. In the event of insolvency of the defendant
company, tort claimants generally have no resort to a compensation fund251
and may face ongoing personal injury expenses. Arguably, those who suffer
financial loss as a result of the tortious conduct of company officers, for
example directors making negligent misrepresentations at the time of
making contracts, should enjoy the same degree of protection as those
investing in companies via a prospectus. Yet the difference in the degree of
legislative safeguards in these two areas could not be more stark. Tort
claimants in the jurisdictions discussed below must rely on common law to
establish their claims against directors, who, in many instances, successfully
250

Employment Rights Act, (1996) (U.K.).
New Zealand is an exception, with its Accident Compensation Corporation for personal injury
victims. See Accident Compensation Corporation, http://www.acc.co.nz/index.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2008).
251
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shield themselves behind the separate legal entity of the company and the
concept of limited liability.
As shown below, directors’ ability to successfully avoid liability has in
part been caused by a misunderstanding or misuse of fundamental legal
doctrines.252 The concept of limited liability relates to the liability of
shareholders, not directors. Shareholders’ liability is limited, in the event of
a winding up, to the amount unpaid, if any, on their shares.253 The concept is
not relevant to the liability of directors or employees or anyone else who acts
on behalf of a company.254
If corporate servants or agents commit a tort whilst acting on behalf of
the company, they are personally liable for their actions, and liability is also
attributed to the company. This doctrine of vicarious liability ensures that
the plaintiff has a viable defendant. In the event of the company’s
insolvency, however, the responsibility to pay the tort victim remains solely
with the tortfeasor. Nonetheless, where that tortfeasor is a director, the
argument is sometimes made that the person was acting as the “directing
mind and will” of the company, so that personal liability should not attach.255
This is known as the organic theory. However, in Commonwealth countries,
according to Stephen J. in the High Court of Australia in Smorgon v.
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.,256 “it has been in areas in
which the ends of justice have been thought to require the attribution of
mental states that the organic theory has been employed and developed.”257
In other words, the fact that the director acted as the company is relevant for
attributing his or her mental intent to the company, for the purpose of
establishing liability on the part of the company where a mental element is
required. It is not intended to relieve that director of personal liability.
Confusion over the meaning of attribution has led to many of the difficulties
in the cases outlined below.
252
See generally, Helen Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’
Tortious Liability to Creditors, 16 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 73.
253
See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001, § 516 (Austl.).
254
See, e.g., Susan Watson & Andrew Willekes, Economic Loss and Directors’ Negligence, J. BUS.
L. 217, 218 (2001).
255
See G.H.L. Fridman, Personal Tort Liability of Company Directors, 5 CANTERBURY L. REV. 41,
54 (1992). Neyers cites as a common misconception of the function of the organic theory that “once
liability is attributed to the separate legal person through the actions of its ‘vital organs,’ the constituent
directors are somehow ‘washed clean’ of legal responsibility.” Jason W. Neyers, Canadian Corporate
Law, Veil Piercing and the Private Law Model Corporation, 50 U. TORONTO L. J. 173, 228 (2000). See
also Ross Grantham, Commentary on Goddard, in CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 65,
68-69 (Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett eds. 1998).
256
Smorgon v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. (1976) 134 C.L.R. 475, 483 (Austl.).
257
This follows Lord Hoffman’s judgment in the United Kingdom in Meridian Global Funds
Management Asia Ltd. v. the Securities Commission, (1995) 2 A.C. 500, 505 (U.K.).
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Within the Commonwealth countries, there are four different tests
courts use to determine the personal liability of directors in tort. Australia
has relatively few cases on point, and these draw heavily on precedents from
other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The “direct or procure” test is the most
common, and has been used in Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
since the development of liability of directors for company torts. It is also
the test most favorable to plaintiffs, and has been used for the torts of
negligence, breach of copyright, nuisance, deceit, and conversion. The
“make the tort his own” test was first applied in 1978 and has been used in
Canada, Britain, and Australia, principally in copyright, passing off, and
patent cases, and is more difficult to make out. The “assumption of
responsibility” test, which was first applied in 1992, has been used in Britain
and New Zealand, mainly in negligent misstatement cases. Commentators
discussing the law relating to a director’s personal liability to creditors in
tort generally confine themselves to these three tests.258 However, a number
of recent cases rely on a fourth rule originating from the decision in Said v.
Butt,259 to find that directors are not liable for the tort of procuring a breach
of contract that they commit while acting for the company.
Commonwealth courts have been troubled by the dual roles of
directors—as people and as the directing mind and will of companies. Le
Dain J. summed up the dilemma facing courts thus:
On the one hand, there is the principle that an incorporated
company is separate and distinct in law from its shareholders,
directors and officers, and it is in the interests of the
commercial purposes served by the incorporated enterprise that
they should as a general rule enjoy the benefit of the limited
liability afforded by incorporation. On the other hand, there is
the principle that everyone should answer for his tortious
acts.260
Each of the tests will now be briefly examined. The first is the “direct or
procure” test. It originally sought to attribute liability to a director for the
tortious actions of a more junior person in the company, where those actions
258
See, e.g., John H. Farrar, The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts, 9 BOND L. REV.
102 (1997), available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol9/iss1/6/; Francis Reynolds, Personal
Liability of Company Directors in Tort, 33 HONG KONG L.J. 51 (2003); Andrew Borrowdale, Directors’
Liability in Tort, N. Z. L.J. 51(1999); Susan Watson & Andrew Willekes, Economic Loss and Directors’
Negligence, J. BUS. L. 217 (2001).
259
Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.).
260
Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc.,
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195, 203 (Can.).
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are directed or procured by the director.261 Later courts, however, have
frequently used the expression “direct or procure” to hold a director liable
for his own actions.262
The “make the tort his own” test originated in Canada in Mentmore
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company
Inc.263 Le Dain J. of the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada found that cases
warranting personal liability exhibited “a knowing, deliberate, wilful quality
to the participation,” “that degree and kind of personal involvement by
which the director or officer makes the tortious act his own.”264
The third test, of “assumption of responsibility,” was outlined in the
New Zealand decision in Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson,265 a
case of negligent misstatement involving a one-man company. Hardie Boys
J. said:
Essentially, I think the test is, or at least includes, whether there
has been an assumption of responsibility, actual or imputed.
That is an appropriate test for the personal liability of both a
director and an employee . . . . Assumption of responsibility
may well arise or be imputed where the director or employee
exercises particular control or control over a particular
operation or activity, . . . This is perhaps more likely to arise
within a large company where there are clear allocations of
responsibility, than in a small one.266
His Honour then commented that the use of a company to carry on the
business could be seen as a personal disclaimer, rather than the basis for
261
It is well accepted that employees are liable in tort for their actions as part of their employment.
Given that they are more likely to be acting under others’ instructions, it seems ironic that this liability is
unchallenged, yet the liability of those who give the instructions is contentious. Even employees
performing the “very essence” of their contract can be held personally liable in tort, according to the
Supreme Court of Canada in London Drugs Ltd. v Kuehne & Nagel Int’l Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, (Can.).
Iacobucci J. there stated: “There is no general rule in Canada to the effect that an employee acting in the
course of his or her employment and performing the ‘very essence’ of his or her contractual obligations
with a customer does not owe a duty of care, whether one labels it ‘independent’ or otherwise, to the
employer’s customer.” Id. at 407-08.
262
In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp. (No 2), [2002] UKHL 43, [2003]
1 A.C. 959, Lord Rodger described the use of the “direct or procure” test to ascribe liability for director’s
own actions as “strangely complex.”
263
Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc.,
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195 (Can.).
264
Id. at 204.
265
Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.). This decision
built on the earlier decision in Fairline Shipping Corp. v. Adamson, [1975] Q.B. 180 (N.Z.). See generally
John H. Farrar, The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts, 9 BOND L. REV. 102, 109 (1997).
266
Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517, 527 (N.Z.).
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imputing an assumption of responsibility.267 In other words, why else would
someone incorporate himself, as in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.,268 if not
to escape from personal responsibility and liability?269
The fourth rule arose from Said v. Butt,270 in which plaintiff brought
action against the managing director of a theatre company for wrongfully
and maliciously procuring the company to breach its contract with the
plaintiff, by refusing him entry after he had purchased a ticket to enter the
theatre. Rather than providing a test of general application, the case simply
stands for the proposition that directors cannot be liable for the tort of
procuring a breach of contract which they commit while acting for the
company.
In Australia, courts have been unable to decide which test to apply.271
Root Quality Pty Ltd. v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. examined and
criticized each test.272 The tests were also canvassed extensively in 2003 in
Johnson Matthey (Aust) Pty Ltd. v. Dascorp Pty. Ltd..273 Root Quality
concluded that the director must be shown to have directed or procured the
tortious conduct of the company.274 In King v. Milpurrurru, the court laid
down a stricter test requiring that the defendant make the tort his own by
deliberately and knowingly pursuing the course of conduct that constituted
the breach.275
Courts differ as to the extent of each test’s application, and as to its
relevant factors. Even though under the “direct or procure” test, Australian
courts generally agree that the holding of an office, such as director or even
managing director, does not itself render the office holder liable for the torts
267

Id. at 528.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (U.K.).
269
In Oakley Inc. v. Oslu Imports and Exports Pty. Ltd., [2000] F.C.A. 700, 35, Finn J. said, citing
Mentmore, Trevor Ivory and Williams, that “such are both the controversies surrounding it in the common
law world and its implications for small companies . . . . that, in the absence of argument directed to the
foundation of the tort—and in particular to whether it properly is to be regarded in the present setting as an
intentional tort—I am not prepared to assume liability from the fact that, as the company's alter ego, Mr.
Tao directed the actions that gave rise to the infringements.”
270
Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.).
271
In G. M. (North Melbourne) v. Young Kelly (1986) 7 I.P.R. 149, 158 directors’ liability for their
tortious actions on behalf of their companies was described as a complex and burgeoning field of the law.
In Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231, 115 (Austl.), Finklestein J.
called it a “confusing picture on an issue that has persistently vexed the common law”. See generally
Helen Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ Tortious Liability to
Creditors, 16 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 73; Helen Anderson, Directors' Personal Liability to Creditors: Theory
versus Tradition, 8 DEAKIN L. REV. 209 (2003).
272
Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231 (Austl.).
273
Johnson Matthey (Aust.) Pty Ltd. v. Dascorp Pty Ltd. (2003) V.S.C. 291 (Austl.).
274
Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231 (Austl.); Microsoft
Corp. v. Auschina Polaris Pty. Ltd. (1996) 142 A.L.R. 111 (Austl.).
275
King v Milpurrurru (1996) 34 I.P.R. 11 (Austl.).
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of the company, the actual degree of involvement required is unresolved.
Personal liability is not dependent on the director knowing that the conduct
is in fact tortious, but there is no agreement as to the extent of involvement
required of the director. In Autocaps (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pro-Kit Pty Ltd.,276
the director was liable as the person “in charge of its affairs” and with
knowledge of the offending behaviour. Martin Engineering Co v. Nicaro
Holdings Pty. Ltd.277 described the director as the “moving spirit.”278 In
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. v. Jain,279 a director was
liable for “countenancing” the breach. As such, the law in Australia remains
unsettled, and it is difficult to predict which test will be applied in a given
fact situation.
Canada280 is similar to Australia in relation to the imposition of
personal liability on directors, in that judicial opinion on the matter diverges.
The Federal Court of Appeal in Mentmore, supra, noted that formulating a
test of general application is a difficult task, and that courts will have
“regard to the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether as
a matter of public policy they call for personal liability.”281
While Mentmore laid down the “make the tort his own” test,282 the
Court of Appeal of Ontario applied the Said v. Butt rule 283 in ADGA Systems
International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd.284 Carthy J.A. found that the rule:
provides an exception to the general rule that persons are
responsible for their own conduct. . . . The exception also
assures that officers and directors, in the process of carrying on
business, are capable of directing that a contract of employment
be terminated or that a business contract not be performed on
the assumed basis that the company’s best interest is to pay
damages for failure to perform. By carving out the exception
for these policy reasons, the court has emphasized and left
276

Autocaps (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pro-Kit Pty Ltd. (1999) 46 I.P.R. 339 (Austl.).
Martin Engineering Co v. Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd. (1999) 100 A.L.R. 358 (Austl.).
278
“Moving spirit” is the expression also used by Sundberg J. in Pioneer Electronics Australia Pty
Ltd. v. Lee (2000) 108 F.C.R. 216, 46 (Austl.), in finding a director liable for the torts of breach of
copyright and passing off. His Honour looked at the various tests of liability, commenting that “[t]he law
on the personal liability of a director for corporate torts is in an uncertain state. There seem to be at least
four views having judicial support.” Id. at 45. He noted that the director “directed and promoted” the
breaches. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
279
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v. Jain (1990) 26 F.C.R. 53 (Austl.).
280
See Sarra, supra note 17.
281
Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc.,
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195, 203 (Can.).
282
Id. at 204.
283
Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.).
284
ADGA Systems Int’l. Ltd v. Valcom Ltd., [1999] 168 (4th) D.L.R. 351 (O.A.C.) (Can.) (Ont.).
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intact the general liability of any individual for personal
conduct.285
The court found that this exception applies where the directors are procuring
a breach of a contract to which their own company is a party. Carthy J.A.
found on the facts that the directors of a company which intentionally
procured the breach of contract of employees of another company, in a
recruitment exercise, were personally liable for the tort.286 In addition,
despite the Said v. Butt287 exception, Carthy J.A. stressed the consistent line
of Canadian authority which holds that “in all events, officers, directors and
employees of corporations are responsible for their tortious conduct even
though that conduct was directed in a bona fide manner to the best interests
of the company.”288
In New Zealand,289 the assumption of responsibility rule from Trevor
290
Ivory is now being applied beyond negligent misstatement cases to “leaky
building” cases.291 The test has been used as an obstacle to property damage
claims against directors, although it was distinguished in Dicks v. Hobson
Swan Construction Ltd. (In Liq.),292 on the basis of the director’s actual
involvement in the project.293
In the United Kingdom,294 a similar debate on the personal liability of
a director qua director in tort has arisen. The House of Lords,295 in Williams
v. Natural Life Health Food Ltd. and Mistlin,296 upheld the “assumption of
285

Id. at 357.
Id. Similar facts led to the same result in Multinail Australia Pty Ltd v. Pryde (Austl.) Pty Ltd.,
(2002) Q.S.C. 105 (Austl.). Chesterman J. confined the rule in Said v. Butt to cases where the director
procured a breach of their own company’s contract, finding that the “direct or procure” test was applicable
otherwise. Id. at 126.
287
Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.).
288
ADGA Systems Int’l. Ltd v. Valcom Ltd., [1999] 168 (4th) D.L.R. 351 (O.A.C.) (Can.) (Ont.).
289
See Noonan & Watson, supra note 28.
290
Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.).
291
Id. See also Sammuel D. Carpenter, Directors’ Liability and Leaky Buildings, N. Z. L.J. 117 (Apr.
2006); N. Campbell, Leaking Homes, Leaking Companies, [2002] C.S.L.B. 101.
292
Dicks v. Hobson Swan Construction Ltd (In Liq.), [2006] 7 N.Z.C.P.R. 881 (H.C.) (N.Z.) (Auck.)
(Baragwanath J).
293
In the last 15 years in New Zealand, there has been increasing amounts of litigation to recover
damages for newly built homes that subsequently suffer water damage. Action has been taken against
builders and developers to recover damages for economic loss, including remedial works, building
consultants’ fees, accommodation costs, travelling costs and other consequential costs of the remedial
works. In a series of cases, New Zealand courts have looked at whether the directors of building
companies have assumed personal responsibility for the building projects.
294
See Lowry, supra note 75.
295
Lord Steyn, with Lord Goff, Lord Hoffman, Lord Clyde and Lord Hutton concurring.
296
Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830 (U.K.). See
also Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett, Directors’ ‘Tortious’ Liability: Contract, Tort or Company Law?,
62 MODERN L. REV. 133 (1999); Andrew Borrowdale, Directors’ Liability in Tort, N. Z. L. J. 51 (1999).
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responsibility” test in a case of negligent misstatement. Lord Steyn
acknowledged the potential for director liability by noting that “whether the
principal is a company or a natural legal person, someone acting on his
behalf may incur personal liability in tort as well as imposing vicarious or
attributed liability upon his principal.”297 Lord Steyn held that neither the
defendant’s state of mind nor his internal arrangements with his company
were relevant to the inquiry. Instead, of relevance was “whether the director,
or anybody on his behalf, conveyed directly or indirectly to the prospective
franchisees that the director assumed personal responsibility towards”298
them.
Approving Trevor Ivory,299 Lord Steyn found that where a director
acts in the capacity of director, he will not be liable. His Lordship
considered that the finding of a Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller &
Partners Ltd.300 “special relationship”301 between plaintiff and company is
not the same as one between plaintiff and director. The key issue was
whether the director had acted in a way that exceeded his corporate authority
as a director, so that any accountability for the tortious act became his alone.
He stated:
in order to establish personal liability under the principle of
Hedley Byrne, which requires the existence of a special
relationship between plaintiff and tortfeasor, it is not sufficient
that there should have been a special relationship with the
principal.
There must have been an assumption of
responsibility such as to create a special relationship with the
director or employee himself.302
Dealing with criticisms of the assumption of responsibility test, Lord Steyn
said:
Returning to the particular question before the House it is
important to make clear that a director of a contracting
company may only be held liable where it is established by
evidence that he assumed personal liability and that there was
297

Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830, 835 (U.K.).
Id.
299
Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.).
300
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465. (H.L. 1963).
301
Id. In Hedley Byrne, the court found that the relationship between the parties was "sufficiently
proximate" as to create a duty of care. This was based on the court’s finding that it was reasonable for the
defendants to have known that the information that they had given would be likely to have been relied upon
in forming a contract. The court stated that this would give rise to a "special relationship," where the
defendant would be required to take sufficient care in giving advice to avoid liability in negligence.
302
Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830, 835 (U.K.).
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the necessary reliance. There is nothing fictional about this
species of liability in tort.303
The law, however, is not settled. In the Standard Chartered Bank case, Lord
Hoffmann rejected the earlier appellate view,304 stating that “[n]o one can
escape liability for fraud by saying ‘I wish to make it clear that I am
committing this fraud on behalf of someone else and I am not to be
personally liable.’”305
In Malaysia, it is rare to find cases holding directors personally liable
for the tortious actions of their companies. One such decision is Victor
Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan.306 In that case, the Court found a director personally
liable for deceit in relation to fraudulent misrepresentations contained in a
sale and purchase document prepared by his company. The Court applied
English authorities307 in determining that the director had authorised or
procured the company to commit the fraudulent misrepresentation.308
South Africa contrasts starkly with the jurisdictions discussed above.
The law of delict, as tort law is known in South Africa, has no difficulty
attributing personal liability to directors, even if directors are simply
carrying out their duties on behalf of the company. The issue of whether the
directors directed or procured the wrongful act of the company therefore
does not arise in South African company law.309
South Korea adopts a different method to find directors liable for their
actions. The Korean Commercial Code provides that:
(1) If directors have acted in contravention of any law or
regulation, or of the articles of incorporation or has neglected to
perform their duties, they [such director] shall be jointly and

303

Id. at 830, 837.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corp., [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 218, 233
(U.K.) (Aldous LJ).
305
See Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corp and others, 1 BUTTERWORTHS
COMPANY LAW CASES 252, 244-259 (D.D. Prentice ed., 2003).
306
Victor Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 M.L.J. 359, [13] (Malay.).
307
See Rainham Chemical Works Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd,. [1921] All E.R. 48 (U.K.);
Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 1 (U.K.).
308
See also Loh Bee Tuan v. Shing Yin Construction (Kota Kinabalu) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 M.L.J. 532,
[540] (Malay.). In Victor Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 M.L.J. 359, [366] (Malay.), the court referred to
and approved of the decision of the Privy Council in Wah Tat Bank Ltd. v. Chan Cheng Kum [1975] 2 All
E.R. 257 (S. Ct.) (Malay.). In that case, Lord Salmon, id. at 272, applied the “direct or procure” test in
imposing personal liability on the director.
309
See M. Havenga, Directors’ Co-liability for Delicts, 18 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L. J. 229 (2006).
304
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severally liable for damages to the company [emphasis added]
[resulting from such acts or omissions].310
Directors are also liable when the act in question is done in accordance with
a resolution of the board, and they have either assented to the resolution, or
failed to enter their dissenting opinion into the company minutes. While the
director is liable to the company and not to any outside party, a party
affected by the directors’ negligence or other fault sues the company, and
then the company recoups this amount from the director.311
In summary, the law protecting tort claimants is diverse and
unsatisfactory in many jurisdictions. The lack of legislative protection of
this group of most vulnerable corporate stakeholders is remarkable. One
could cynically conclude that legislatures are not in fact interested in
deterrence and compensation of those adversely affected by corporate
misbehavior, unless their contact with the company is voluntary and there
are potentially large numbers of people involved. Investors might be
dissuaded from providing capital to companies without adequate safeguards.
Because this would have adverse economic effects, there is an incentive to
enact stringent provisions to encourage investor confidence. The foregoing
discussion shows that jurisdictions around the world have come to the same
conclusion.
Tort claimants, on the other hand, are involuntary, likely to be few in
number, and have no economic value to add to the corporation. Yet it is
noteworthy that even contract creditors who have voluntarily entered into
dealings with companies have not received more favourable treatment from
the courts; indeed, in some cases, their consent to deal with a limited liability
entity has been counted as a factor against a finding of liability on the part of
the tortfeasor director.312 Contrast this with the position of an investor in a
limited liability corporation, armed with an entire prospectus before deciding
to invest.
D.

Conclusion on Diversity of Laws in Selected Jurisdictions

This Part has looked at three areas of law where there is considerable
dissimilarity among jurisdictions. Insolvent trading, which acts to protect
unsecured trade creditors, has wide international variations. Many countries
310
Commercial Code, 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 641 (Korea Legislation
Research Institute 1962) (emphasis added).
311
Id. § 399 (1).
312
See also H. Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ Tortious
Liability to Creditors, 16 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 73 (2004).
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require fault, sometimes in terms of fraud, negligence, recklessness, or
breach of duty. The format of the various pieces of legislation differs as
well. Even in Australia under an apparently stringent legislative regime,
parties face difficulties in terms of recovery. Canada, unlike other
Commonwealth countries, has no insolvent trading laws at all.
Employee entitlements receive very limited legislative protection in
the countries examined. Canada’s regime, the most generous, imposes strict
liability, subject to a due diligence defence. As noted in Part C, supra, the
subjective element in Australia’s test renders it useless, necessitating a
government assistance scheme funded by taxpayers. New Zealand’s scheme
relies on the initiative of a government official, and is limited in the amounts
recoverable. The other countries looked at above have no laws imposing
liability on directors.
The rights of tort claimants were examined in some of the
Commonwealth countries. There is no relevant legislation, and courts have
struggled to enunciate tests of general application. In part this is because of
a misunderstanding of the laws of attribution. The director is seen as the
directing mind and will of the company, and therefore his actions become
the actions of the company itself, rather than his own. Something special
needs to be done to make the director personally liable for the tort, such as
“making the tort his own” or an assumption of personal responsibility.
There is no question that company employees committing torts are
personally liable for their actions, in addition to the company being
vicariously liable. Directors’ liability for their own tortious conduct is
recognized in jurisdictions such as South Africa and South Korea. There is
nothing in the doctrine of limited liability or separate legal entity that
prevents a director’s actions from being attributed to the company for the
purpose of making the company vicariously liable, as well as being a basis
for personal liability. Indeed, this point is made abundantly clear in the
examination of the legislation in Part II and in this Part. Recovery for tort
claimants has been left to the vagaries of the common law, and the most
significant problem for them is the lack of legislative will to entrench their
rights of recovery. A possible reason for this will be discussed in the next
Part.
IV.

REASONS FOR SIMILARITY AND DIVERSITY

The preceding examination of the similarity and diversity of laws
across various jurisdictions inevitably leads to the question of why this
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should be so. Indeed, it is equally valid to question why they should be
similar, as it is to exclaim their differences.
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate, after an extensive examination of
these laws and jurisdictions, to speculate on why these laws are the way they
are. What follows is a brief review of the literature on similarities and
differences in laws, to suggest some possible reasons why the laws surveyed
in Parts II and III above should be as they are. It does not attempt to draw
any definitive conclusions.
It should be noted much of the comparative corporate law literature
on convergence and divergence concentrates on the broader governance
debate, rather than the narrower focus on directors’ liability for their
companies’ faults and defaults. Still, the same forces appear to be applicable
to the present enquiry. Broadly speaking, these can be summarized as
political, economic, practical, and evolutionary (or path dependent).
Political influences both for and against similarity are numerous.
They include pressure from interest groups and institutions,313 such as
business associations, trade unions, employer groups, consumer
organizations, and local and international environmental lobbies.314 While
pressure may be to reform the law to acknowledge the needs of a group’s
particular constituents, often vested interests can actively work to protect
themselves against legislative reform.315 Responses to corporate scandals
can result in knee-jerk legislative reform tailored to the particular
situation,316 as can a major environmental disaster.317 The political
persuasion of the incumbent government will also affect its stance on
corporate law reform,318 as will the extent to which law is made by the

313

H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 453

(2000).
314
These include the United Nations Environment Programme, Greenpeace, and the World Wild
Fund for Nature, amongst many hundreds of others.
315
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 459-460 (discussing the arguments made in Lucien
Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependance in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 127 (1999)).
316
J. Hill, The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance, 27
SYDNEY L. REV. 743, 750 (2005). “[P]ost-Enron regulatory developments are a potent reminder that
corporate events of this magnitude can generate new divergence in laws.” Hill cites here the introduction
in the United States of the Sarbanes Oxley legislation, and in Australia, of CLERP 9. “The architecture of
these laws often directly tracks the contours of local scandals.” Id. at 751. See also J. Hill, Regulatory
Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 3 WIS. INT’L L. J. 367 (2005).
317
For example, the CERCLA laws in the United States, discussed supra Part II.C and note 155,
which were enacted in response to the environmental damage caused at Love Canal.
318
This can include calls to reduce the compliance burden on business, which can result in less
legislative intervention in corporate business.
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courts, as opposed to the legislature.319 Some countries have more
sophisticated theoretical frameworks and existing mechanisms, such as Law
Reform Commissions and dedicated parliamentary committees, for the
process of law reform than others.320
Other relevant political factors include whether the country is run by a
democratically elected government or not,321 levels of judicial and legislative
accountability, and the overall transparency of the political process. This is
not to say, however, that similar forms of government necessarily lead to
identical or similar law. This has been borne out by the comparison of the
laws of Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom,
where significant differences were noted. The law as it is applied can also
differ from the “law on the books,” due to lack of political will to enforce
it.322 This is sometimes the result in a country into which law has been
transplanted, perhaps by former colonial governors.323
There can also be implicit or explicit political pressures from outside
the country to adopt certain laws, for example, in order to be accepted into a
trade group or other alliance. The European Union is a good example of this
phenomenon.324 Membership is in some instances contingent on adoption of
harmonized laws, even though these are not always successful in the absence
of supporting institutions and culture.325
319

Katharina Pistor notes that “[l]egal systems that have facilitated this process of adaptation and
were able to respond to new legal lacunae created by change have proved to be more successful over time.
From the perspective of legal innovation, common law countries have been more successful than civil law
countries . . . .” Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison,
23(4) U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 794 (2002).
320
See, e.g., in Australia: the Australian Law Reform Commission, the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, and the Companies and Markets Advisory Committee;
in New Zealand: the Law Commission; in Malaysia: the Corporate Law Reform Committee, and the High
Level Finance Committee; in Hong Kong: the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission; in South Africa: the
South African Law Reform Commission; in Canada: the Law Reform Commission of Canada; and in the
United Kingdom: the Law Commission in the United Kingdom.
321
There are endless varieties of democracies too: O. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37(1) MOD. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1974).
322
See Hill, Persistent Debate, supra note 316, at 747.
323
Malaysia is an example. While some of its law, including common law precedents, is drawn from
the United Kingdom, in practice the laws are not enforced because of Malaysia’s political considerations
and its different market economy.
324
See Paul J. Omar, The Emergence of a New European Legal Order in Insolvency, INT’L.
COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 262 (2004); Paul J. Omar, Four Models for Rescue: Convergence or
Divergence in European Insolvency Laws? Part I, INT’L COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 127 (2007); Paul J.
Omar, Four Models for Rescue: Convergence or Divergence in European Insolvency Laws? Part 2, INT’L
COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 171 (2007); M. Cristina di Luigi, An Invasive Top-Down Harmonisation or a
Respectful Framework Model of National Laws? A Critique of the Societas Europaea Model, INT’L
COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 58 (2008).
325
Hill gives the example of the transplantation of corporate governance laws to Russia in the 1990’s
commenting upon the “conundrum of corporate governance—the fact that the transplantation of
demonstrably good laws may be totally ineffective.” Hill, Persistent Debate, supra note 316, at 750.
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A multitude of economic influences also drive similarity of laws.
Access to the international market for capital can be a major motivating
force for harmonization of laws, and the capital raising laws across the
various jurisdictions outlined above provide evidence of this. A “Force of
Example”326 argument also exists, whereby jurisdictions adopt the laws of
successful economies, in an attempt to match their economic achievements.
For example, Hansmann and Kraakman claim that the predominance of the
shareholder primacy model will inevitably lead to widespread convergence
of the institutions of corporate governance.327
The prevalence of multinational corporations and their desire to
operate in acceptable regulatory environments is also a factor, as is the need
for cross listing on foreign stock exchanges. The pervasiveness of
international legal, accounting and consulting firms, as well as investment
banks, can also lead to a demand for more homogeneity in corporate law.328
Not all economic influences, of course, lead to convergence of laws. It can
in fact be more economically efficient to have different laws, to take
advantage of local conditions.329 Some multinationals might deliberately
seek to locate some of their operations in countries with more liberal laws
than their original countries of incorporation, precisely to avoid certain
stringent requirements, for example in relation to labor laws or emissions
controls.
Practical considerations can mitigate against following the examples
of legislative reform set by other countries. Inertia is a powerful force,
because law reform of any kind, including convergence with other
jurisdictions, generally requires legislative action, often following extensive
and costly government consultation processes.
The availability of
alternative means of protecting a certain cohort of corporate stakeholders
can also result in dissimilarities of laws, simply because the foreign laws are
not required; on the other hand, where protection cannot be found through
other means, such as contract, the “Force of Logic”330 can drive relevant
stakeholders to seek a superior method of protection, often borrowed from
another jurisdiction.

326

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 450.
According to Hansmann and Kraakman, “[t]here are three principal factors driving consensus on
the standard model: the failure of alternative models; the competitive pressures of global commerce; and
the shift of interest group influence in favor of an emerging shareholder class.” Id. at 443.
328
Id. at 449.
329
Id. at 464.
330
Id. at 449.
327
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The evolution of local laws and path dependence331 can have a marked
effect on the adoption of laws originating in other jurisdictions. The
similarities of laws amongst Commonwealth countries demonstrate their
common ancestry, but they also owe much to similarities in culture, property
rights, parliamentary and judicial systems, accounting standards and a
variety of other supporting mechanisms. Scholars refer to this as
“complementarities,”332 where laws which fit well with a broad range of
local institutions are likely to survive.333
Kahn-Freund points to the degree of adjustment required to suit the
laws’ new home and the chances of rejection of the transplant, making an
analogy between the transplantation of a kidney from one body to another
and of a carburetor from one car to another.334 Any particular instance of
transplantation of laws is a point on this continuum from kidney to
carburetor, and is affected by the political, economic, practical, and
evolutionary factors outlined above.
Kahn-Freund also points to
environmental factors such as increasing industrialization, urbanization,
worldwide communications and the ease of movement of people as
contributing to a more homogenous world for law, including corporate
law.335
Of course, the issue of convergence and divergence of laws across
jurisdictions needs to be considered against the background of the need for
laws to grow and develop within jurisdictions. Each individual instance of
legal evolution, especially in response to the political and economic needs of
the particular country as noted above, has the capacity to bring further
diversity to laws.336
331
In relation to corporate governance, see L. Bebchuk & M. J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52(1) STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
332
Id. at 140. See R. H. Schmidt & G. Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and
Complementarity, 5(3) INT’L FIN. 311 (2002).
333
Conversely, laws which are inconsistent with their local environment, possibly because they were
transplanted from a jurisdiction with different norms, are less likely to be successful or remain in their
original form. Schmidt and Spindler note that the cost of changing laws or institutions may outweigh the
possible efficiency or welfare gain which the change is intended to achieve. See Schmidt & Spindler, supra
note 332, at 314. There needs to be a commitment to maintain the newly introduced laws, which, by
definition, did not originate organically from that country, and therefore are arguably unlikely to be a
“natural fit.” Bebchuk and Roe describe the tendency to revert to prior practice as “persistence.” Bebchuk
& Roe, supra note 331, at 136. Schmidt and Spindler stress that “a local optimum may be different from a
global optimum. What constitutes the nearest, and seemingly most attractive, local optimum depends on
the starting point at which a given biological or social system happens to be at a given point in time.” See
Schmidt & Spindler, supra note 332, at 315.
334
Kahn-Freund, supra note 321, at 5-6.
335
Id. at 9.
336
Katharina Pistor notes that “[t]he corporation has been a remarkably resilient institution for 200
years of industrialisation and modernisation largely because of its capacity to adapt constantly to a
changing environment.” Pistor et al., supra note 319, at 793-94.
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This Part has sought to examine briefly why laws may be similar or
different across jurisdictions. It does not seek to conclude whether they
should be similar or different. What is apparent from the examination of the
six areas of law in this article is that similarity of laws is associated with the
considerable protection of powerful corporate stakeholders—shareholders
and revenue authorities, as well as the conspicuous environment lobby—
whereas leniency of laws as well as diversity of laws have a degree of
correlation with vulnerable and often forgotten stakeholder cohorts—
unsecured trade creditors, employees and tort creditors.
The fact that stringent laws correlate with widespread international
similarity, and conversely that lenient laws correlate with widespread
dissimilarity, perhaps should come as no surprise. Arguably, the reasons
behind their stringency underpin their adoption throughout the jurisdictions
examined. For example, many jurisdictions have laws requiring directors to
pay the unremitted taxes of their companies at the time of corporate
insolvency. It is unsurprising that protecting the national revenue base is a
major political consideration throughout the world, and that similar
measures providing against corporate default in this context are embraced
across many jurisdictions.
Likewise, the extensive acceptance of similar capital raising laws
reflects the globalization of the international securities market and the need
to ensure the confidence of shareholders. Common or similar laws in
relation to the protection of the environment demonstrate the effectiveness
of national and international lobby groups. It also shows recognition by
governments that the protection of the environment is important for political
and economic reasons, as well as for its own sake.
In contrast, the protection of vulnerable stakeholder groups337—
unsecured trade creditors, employees and tort claimants—is internationally
diverse. Employees generally benefit from unemployment benefits and
sometimes from government schemes, which takes much of the impetus
away from calls to hold directors personally liable for their unpaid
entitlements. Trade creditors get relatively little sympathy from courts and
legislators, and are expected to protect themselves through a variety of
measures such as diversification and through pricing their goods and
337
See also J. Lipson, Directors Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially
Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1193 (2003). Interestingly, Lipson includes taxing
authorities in his description of “low VCE creditors.” These are parties who “lack volition, cognition and
exit.” This describes creditors who lack voluntariness in their dealings with the company (tort creditors,
taxing authorities, terminated employees); lack information (cognition) about the true state of company
affairs; and lack the ability to exit from these relationships because of the absence of a market to sell their
rights against the company.
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services to self-insure against loss. A disparate group, they lack the political
power to lobby for a better deal. Likewise, tort creditors lack a common
voice to call for legislative protection, in the event of corporate insolvency.
This leads to a simple hypothesis—that the forces which have resulted
in stringent laws within a country are the same as those which lead to
convergence internationally. The converse applies equally—the forces
which have brought about a tepid response to protection of a stakeholder
group within a country tend to produce laws which are not likely to be
emulated internationally.
Another, perhaps cynical, observation can be drawn from the
examination of the laws in Parts II and III. It is that when legislators are
committed to defending a particular institution—in particular, the revenue
base and the securities market—the laws they pass can be quite draconian,
with very little opportunity for directors to escape liability. There is no
apparent fear that the imposition of liability will make directors risk averse,
to the detriment of their companies and the economy, or that talented
businesspeople will be reluctant to accept directorships with such a harsh
liability regime.
This sort of argument, in Australia at least, appears to be reserved for
discussions of liability in relation to insolvent trading or the protection of
employee entitlements,338 yet it has been shown above that these are two of
the least generous forms of protection available to corporate stakeholders.
Australia’s new government is raising the issue again,339 and it will be
interesting to see what forms of directorial liability come under the closest
scrutiny in this regard.
V.

CONCLUSION

Jurisdictions throughout the world lift the corporate veil to impose
liability on directors for corporate faults and defaults. A range of
jurisdictions and six areas of law were chosen here for comparison. There is
widespread similarity in the laws relating to capital raising, and also
338
Byrne has argued that: “the more serious cost is the effect the liability regime will have on the
performance of the director. Their inability to efficiently cope with the liability would logically mean
further incentive to avoid the riskier ventures which raise the potential losses. It is this cost which may be
seen to be of significant social consequence. It is extremely difficult to measure the size of such cost and,
therefore, whether or not it will outweigh the benefits to creditors . . . .” Mark Byrne, An Economic
Analysis of Directors’ Duties in Favour of Creditors, 4 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 275, 283 (1994). See also
Victor Yeo & Joyce Lin, Insolvent Trading—A Comparative and Economic Approach, 10 AUSTRALIAN J.
CORP. L. 216, 234 (1999); David B. Noakes, The Recovery of Employee Entitlements in Insolvency, in
COMPANY DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR INSOLVENT TRADING 129, 139 (I. Ramsay ed., 2000).
339
See Henry, supra note 2.
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considerable overlap in laws relating to the recovery of unremitted taxation
installments and protection of the environment. On the other hand, there are
noticeable dissimilarities among insolvent trading laws, recovery of
employee entitlements and protection of tort creditors.
This illustrates two points: that there are many ways in which to
legislate to achieve similar objectives, and that, in certain areas, some
governments do not consider legislation to be required, whereas others
consider it necessary.
While there are many reasons for convergence and divergence of
laws, based on political, economic, practical and evolutionary reasons, a
pattern is suggested from the areas of law examined—that areas of stringent
liability on directors broadly, but not precisely, correspond with widespread
international adoption of similar laws, and conversely that more lenient laws
are unlikely to be copied internationally. In other words, even where
formats differ, governments appear to agree on which questions of law
require a firm legislative response, and which do not. Whether these
assessments are correct is a matter for other research.340

340
See Helen Anderson, Corporate Social Responsibility—the Case for Unsecured Creditors, 7(1)
OXFORD UNIVERSITY COMMONWEALTH LAW JOURNAL 93–124 (2007); Anderson, Directors’ Liability for
Unpaid Employee Entitlements, supra note 85.

